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FOREWORD
This monograph was presented at the Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference
connected with the Council’s U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically
addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset
policy with Moscow that concern arms control and
proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the
question of whether further reductions in strategic
offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it
possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently
signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses
that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of
tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to
have Russia reduce. The asymmetries in force structures and in strategic orientations of the two or three
main actors, the United States, NATO, and Russia,
will make it difficult to move forward on these issues
quickly.
At the same time, a key component of the reset
policy is to obtain Russian assistance in stopping, if
not reversing, Iranian and North Korean proliferation.
Here, it appears that the reset policy has reached the
limit of its utility, for Russia maintains a highly ambivalent and ambiguous policy with respect to Iran and
the Six-Party Talks on North Korea have reached an
impasse. This monograph analyzes Russia’s posture
on these issues and suggests alternative courses of
action for the United States to undertake with regard
to Russia in order to advance U.S. goals, particularly
with respect to the Korean issue.
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This is the first publication to come out of the conference, and this series of publications continues SSI’s
mandate and past record of publishing timely and
substantive contributions to the debate on critical national security issues as well as its record of academic
outreach with leading institutions of higher learning,
research, and debate on these selfsame issues of national security.
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SUMMARY
This monograph was presented at the Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference
connected with the Council’s U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically
addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset
policy with Moscow that concern arms control and
proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the
question of whether further reductions in strategic
offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it
possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently
signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses
that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of
tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes
to have Russia reduce.
Therefore, this analysis delves deeply into Russia’s
strategic posture with regard to the questions of why
it needs and prioritizes nuclear weapons and what it
thinks about the necessity for retaining large numbers
of them (relatively speaking) to meet the security challenges posed not only by the United States and NATO,
but also China. Based on this analysis, which takes into
account the asymmetries in force structures and in
strategic orientations of the two or three main actors,
the author argues that the United States, NATO, and
Russia will find it difficult to move forward on these
issues quickly and achieve large-scale nuclear reductions or strategic harmony in the foreseeable future.
At the same time, a key component of the reset
policy is to obtain Russian assistance in stopping, if
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not reversing, Iranian and North Korean proliferation.
Here, it appears that the reset policy has reached the
limit of its utility, for Russia maintains a highly ambivalent and ambiguous policy with respect to Iran.
As a result, we are possibly reaching a political dead
end regarding Iran. Meanwhile, the Six-Party Talks on
North Korea have reached an impasse.
This monograph analyzes Russia’s posture on
these issues and suggests alternative courses of action
for the United States to undertake with regard to Russia in order to advance U.S. goals, particularly with
respect to the Korean issue. The approaches suggested
by the author regarding the impasse over Korea place
this issue in a broader regional setting and take into
account the fact that this issue is fully implicated in
and involves the fast-changing dynamics of the overall international situation in Northeast Asia, e.g., the
Rise of China and Russo-Chinese partnership there. It
suggests far-reaching and innovative measures for the
United States to take that would possibly break the
logjam over Korea, but also would enable the United States to uphold a viable strategic equilibrium in
Northeast Asia under conditions of dramatic change
there.
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ARMS CONTROL AND PROLIFERATION
CHALLENGES
TO THE RESET POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The so-called New Start Treaty between Russia and
the United States entered into force in February 2011.
Consequently, this treaty constitutes a baseline for all
future bilateral, if not multilateral, efforts at arms control and nonproliferation involving these two powers,
including President Barack Obama’s long-term commitment to reaching nuclear zero. Moreover, due to
the saliency of the issues of tactical nuclear weapons
(TNW) and missile defenses in any future negotiation,
this treaty possesses great importance for the future
architecture of European security as well. The same
holds true as Russia and the United States reduce their
nuclear arsenals in the context of China’s unceasing
rise in military power that causes anxiety for both
these states. Therefore, the treaty and subsequent
arms control developments will possess considerable
or even greater significance for Asian security, especially from Russia’s standpoint.1
Finally, this treaty is the most important and impressive manifestation of what the two governments
view as the success of the Obama administration’s reset policy since 2009. Certainly, it is the most tangible
expression of bilateral cooperation under that policy
framework. So if something happened to the treaty
and the new regime it postulates, the reset policy
would likely fall apart. Yet, despite its importance, the
success of the reset policy, and of future bilateral or
multilateral accords on arms control and nonproliferation, is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, one thing
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both sides, as well as external observers, agree about
is the very fragility of the reset policy.2 And it is quite
likely that if this policy were to falter, it would also diminish chances for further reductions in strategic arsenals among all nuclear powers, not just Russia and
the United States. Thus the reasons for this fragility
and the consequences for arms control and future cooperation on nonproliferation issues must be clarified.
There are many reasons for this fragility. Already
by February 2011, discordant notes on European security were being heard in the European-Russian dialogue, a large part of whose current agenda is connected to issues of missile defenses and TNW, indicating
substantive differences of outlook on key questions
and continuing mutual mistrust.3 Moreover, Russian
governmental figures like Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov now say that the the test of Russian relations
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and of NATO’s “sincerity” is progress towards creating a joint missile defense system on Russia’s terms.4
This posture is analogous to Moscow’s similar statements that the success of the new treaty depends on
the United States not building its missile defense system, for Russia has already formally stated that such
construction, if it continues, represents grounds for
withdrawal from the treaty. Some may believe that
these positions are merely negotiating tactics. But they
also suggest a continuing Russian resort to the Soviet
tactic of endless demands based on a sense that Moscow can keep pushing at no cost to divide NATO and
induce Western concessions, while also attempting
to browbeat or intimidate the West into concessions.
They also suggest Moscow’s continuing obsession
with being able to intimidate Europe with the unimpeded threat of nuclear strikes against key European
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targets and its linked belief in the possiblity of using
nuclear weapons in a warfighting role, however circumscribed that role might be. Nevertheless, Russia’s
positions on these particular issues are hardly the only
reasons for concern over the fragility of the reset policy, arms control, and progress on nonproliferation.
Beyond those policy differences and the longstanding mutual suspicion between Moscow and the
West as a whole (not just Washington), there exist
substantial domestic constituencies in both the United
States and Russia who are still driven by fundamental
mistrust of each other. While those parties could not
stop ratification of the treaty, major strategic issues still
divide Russia and the United States as much as they
unite them. For example, 39 Republican Senators cautioned the Obama administration about allowing Russia undue influence over the U.S. (and NATO) missile
defense program.5 And Republican Senate leaders are
now attempting to force the administration to lock in
$85 billion for nuclear modernization programs.6 One
could easily find analogous constituencies in Russian
politics.
What drives these state-to-state, or NATO-Russia,
and intrastate domestic struggles are deep-rooted fears
of each other, as well as continuing regional rivalries.
Apart from the fate of arms control in the future, the
potential for major regional rivalries in Eurasia, or unforeseen events like the NATO air operation against
Libya that began in March 2011, have the potential to
undermine, disrupt, and even possibly rupture the reset relationship. Apart from consideration of trends in
arms control policy, we must remember Abraham Lincoln’s observation that “I claim not to have controlled
events, but confess plainly that events have controlled
me.” Thus issues unrelated to the arms control agenda
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can seriously compromise the capability of both Russia and the United States to move forward on that
agenda as happened in 2001-09 and before that in the
1970s and 1990s. Indeed, it has generally been the case
that while Moscow and Washington have been able
to find agreement on issues of bilateral arms control,
previous efforts at détente in the 1970s, 1990s, and
2001-09 have faltered largely due to rivalries over regional security questions in Eurasia. Today because so
many of those issues remain unresolved and new ones
like the NATO operation in Libya frequently crop up
on the international agenda, the potential for discord
remains strong.
This is especially the case as major bilateral disputes over missile defenses, TNW, and Eurasian security have only been temporarily suppressed but not
resolved, while both sides’ gains from the reset are
of dubious durability. Furthermore, as Libya shows,
Russia remains unwilling to accept the bottom line
of U.S. national security policy, i.e., American leadership and (the intermittent) promotion of a global
democratic order (which Russia regards as efforts at
a unilateralist hegemony).7 Likewise, the gains for the
United States may not be lasting either. As of this writing, there is no sign of lasting progress in Afghanistan, even though the United States killed Osama Bin
Laden on May 2, 2011 (local time), and U.S. plans for
remaining there after 2014 already arouse Russian
suspicions.8 Moreover, both Iranian and North Korean proliferation continue unabated, calling into question the profitability and sustainability for the United
States of the reset policy.
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RUSSIA’S AMERICAN OBSESSION
Meanwhile, in Russia’s case it is even fair to call its
fears about U.S. power, policies, and proclivities obsessions concerning U.S. objectives. Russian journalist
Leonid Radzikhovsky has said, “The existential void
of our politics has been filled entirely by anti-Americanism” and that to renounce this rhetoric “would be
tantamount to destroying the foundations of the state
ideology.”9 Similarly, Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia in Global Affairs, writes that:
The mentality of Russian politics is such that relations
with the United States remain at the center of universal
attention and virtually any problems are seen though
an American prism. This is partially a reflection of
inertia of thinking which is finding it hard to break
with perceptions of Cold War times. It is partially a
demonstration of a hidden desire to have a sense of
our own significance. There is still a desire to compare
ourselves specifically with the only superpower.10

Lukyanov also notes that both the United States
and Russia see the other as being a power in decline.11
And at least one Russian writer boasts that Russia
bears primary responsibility for frustrating American unilateralism by shaping blocking coalitions that
restrained and ultimately foiled U.S. designs.12 Such
thinking validates the contention by Kari Roberts, a
Canadian scholar, that, “It appears as though the common themes in Russian foreign policymaking continue to be how Russia views itself vis-à-vis the U.S. and
its pragmatic approach to identifying and tackling
foreign policy problems.”13 For example, there is good
reason to see Russia’s Iranian policy as being closely
tied to its perceptions of U.S. policies.
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Concurrently, in Russia (if not the United States)
issues connected to nuclear weapons make for major
manifestations of political theater, and in both countries these issues are utilized for scoring points for or
against parties in power regardless of the truth.14 In
the Russian case, this appears not just in overt and
covert domestic political struggles, but also in the
widespread, ingrained, and wholly unsubstantiated
conclusion that the United States is essentially Russia’s enemy and trying to suppress it, if not break it
up, and that U.S. politics, like Russian politics, is essentially a matter of dictating to smaller powers and
endless conspiracies, either mainly against Russia or
within the U.S. Government. After all, that is the elite’s
own experience of Russian politics. And this habit of
Russian projection of domestic phenomena and values onto the “other,” i.e., the main enemy, the United
States, dates back to Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.
This projection process institutionalizes what can only
be called political or nuclear paranoia in the realm of
threat assessment and political analysis, as well as the
personal predilections of Vladimir Putin and many
other figures.15 As this writer has observed elsewhere,
Russian elites still officially subscribe to a watered
down version of a Leninist threat paradigm that links
together supposed internal “enemies” of the regime
with outside powers, and this paradigm is regularly
invoked by Russian authorities whenever problems
manifest themselves.16
Indeed, it is not too much to say that there is a
deeply held elite obsession with the United States as
an exemplar enemy and potential partner, yet which
is simultaneously regarded as being an a priori hostile
power. This obsession with status, sovereignty, etc.,
and the U.S. attitude towards Russia, which is often
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perceived to be the mainspring of the overall U.S. international policy, contrasts sharply with the growing
relative indifference in U.S. elite circles and U.S. society at large to Russia and its affairs.17 Thus Richard
Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the
Ronald Reagan administration wrote about the U.S.Russian relationship that:
In fact, that relationship has declined in importance to
the point where it makes little difference whether the
Russians have more nuclear weapons or fewer than
they do now. The calculations of the consequences of a
nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, a proper obssession during the Cold War, are no
longer relevant, and despite President Obama’s overblown claims, the New START Treaty is of no substantial benefit.18

This argument infuriates Russian elites, but there
actually is considerable truth to it, as anyone observing the level of U.S. interest in Russia would quickly
find out.
Another way of articulating this problem is to note
that it is the fundamental nature of the Russian domestic political system, and a fact heightened by its
juxtaposition to the U.S. and European systems, that
drives the dynamic of hostility in East-West relations
and fosters a situation where Russian thinking about
security takes its cognitive and policy points of departure from what the German philosopher Carl Schmitt
called the presupposition of conflict.19 On a regular basis, the glaring asymmetries in the two sides’ domestic
political systems engender long-lasting perceptions
based on mutual or reciprocal suspicion among powerful domestic constituencies that then try to obstruct
meaningful progress in arms control or in overcoming
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outstanding differences on regional security issues in
Eurasia. Consequently, any effort to determine not just
Russia’s posture but its evolving perspectives must
take into account both the competing security orientations of the two states and the so-called values gap
that fuels the mistrust, in order to understand Russian
thinking to determine where accords can be reached
or differences bridged and where they cannot be so
resolved.
Meanwhile despite the treaty and the supposed
bonhomie generated by the bilateral rapprochement,
in 2010-11 the supposed U.S./NATO threat still drives
Russian planning. We see this in many different expressions of Russian policy. For example, Dmitri
Trenin has written that:
To demonstrate how seriously the Kremlin views that
issue of U.S. missile defense capabilities, look at Russia’s national security strategy, released in May (2009).
The document calls a U.S. first-strike capability, which
is attainable once the United States builds a seamless
global missile defense system, the most serious external military threat to Russia. Short of an actual first
strike, a shift in the strategic balance would allow the
United States to blackmail Russia politically. This may
be paranoia, but there are reasons for it. In a situation
when the United States and Russia are not allies, or
even strategic partners, nuclear deterrence has become
the unique pillar of Moscow’s strategic independence
vis-à-vis Washington.20

Similarly Dmitri Suslov also argues that Moscow
considers the United States a “potential enemy” and
seeks to maintain nuclear parity with it by any means
and a quantitative advantage in TNW to include AngloFrench nuclear forces, which it also regards as hostile.
Indeed, he observes that Russia is now discussing de8

veloping new types of nuclear missiles to compensate
for the creation of missile defense elements within the
NATO framework in Bulgaria, Romania, the Eastern
Mediterranean, and Poland.21 In a similar vein, it is not
unusual to find in the Russian press analyses purporting to argue that despite the visible denuclearization
of the U.S. arsenal, Washington still has plans that it
is developing for a preemptive nuclear strike against
Russia.22
By the same token, we find exceptionally well-connected analysts like Sergei Karaganov, Director of the
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, claiming that
those pursuing nuclear zero are either motivated to or
are unwittingly preparing trouble for Russia. Thus he
writes that:
It is obvious that the philosophy of mutual confrontation has not been overcome and has even received
an energetic fillip as a result of the disarmament talks
[this was before the treaty-author], although we do not
actually threaten each other. We no longer have the
contradictions whose resolution might envisage war,
and we have many common interests. The professional ‘disarmers’ who have become more lively as a result
of the treaty’s success are ready to draw us into new
disarmament races which will open new “Pandora’s
boxes.” The American coalition of antinuclear dreamers and cold cynics, who were seeking to convert the
United States’ nonuclear superiority into political influence through the reduction of its nuclear arms that
were cheapening it, has failed to launch movement
toward a “nuclear zero.” In addition, it turns out that
it will not be possible to maintain even this superiority
because of budget deficits in America.23

We also see this threat assessment in the new effort to create a force to keep the United States at bay.
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President Dmitry Medvedev has recently decreed the
creation of a new joint aerospace defense strategy and
force structure combining existing air forces, antiaircraft, and ballistic missile defense (BMD) units with
Russia’s early warning system and space control assets that is to be organized by the end of 2011.24 The
subsequent creation of this new aerospace defense
force (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona or VKO)
with 70,000 new officers can only reinforce that threat
perception, since it is precisely a NATO/U.S. air-space
attack that is the scenario most dreaded by Russian
planners.
In fact, Russian military leaders openly state that
in the context of the concurrent negotiations that led
to the treaty and its aftermath and Russia’s defense
reform that began in 2008, the role of the Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF) will actually grow despite the reductions in numbers.25 Moreover, beginning in 2009
the Russian military began to modernize its nuclear
arsenal with new systems, prolong existing ones, develop its command control capabilities, etc. In that
context, the chief claim of the new RS-12 and RS-24
(Yars) missile systems is that they have independently
targeted warheads and can evade (or so it is claimed)
any Western missile defense, an attribute that allegedly fulfills former President Putin’s earlier promise of
asymmetric measures against U.S. missile defenses.26
Simultaneously Russia is pursuing an agreement with
the Obama administration that would give it access to
U.S. technology for interceptors designed to destroy
enemy missiles on impact.27
Although critics of the administration’s policy
point to this effort that is consonant with the administration’s efforts to loosen export controls, reset with
Russia, and move towards nuclear zero as a perfect
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storm; it is equally, if not even more, illustrative of the
schizophrenic Russian atittude that while the United
States is its main enemy, it also is the purveyor of
the most desired and needed Russian defense technologies. Therefore, a reset or detente-like policy with
America is needed.28 Even after the treaty was signed,
prominent defense commentators like Mikhail Barabanov wrote that the role of nuclear deterrence in
Russian relations with the United States will actually
grow because:
The U.S. will never view Russia as a friend even in
principle, because existence of other powerful countries is in principle unacceptable to America as the
world hegemon, as they limit Washington’s claims for
world supremacy by the very fact of their existence.
There are two such countries now, namely Russia and
China. Actually this very fact is the main reason for
tensions in the U.S.’ relations with Russia and China
under any regimes.29

Other arguments along this line, e.g., a recent commentary by Retired General M. A. Gareyev, President
of the Academy of Military Sciences, typically contend
that geopolitical pressures from the United States and
China will only grow, that future wars may not be confined to local or regional theaters, and that “regarding
security, Russia has never been in such a crunch as
in the early 21st century since, perhaps, 1612.” This is
a rather bizarre and even hysterical threat perception
for a World War II veteran.30 Nevertheless, such analyses are all too visible in Russian public commentary
on defense and security issues.
Meanwhile, this fear of such a U.S. and allied aerospace attack has been a major, though hardly the only,
cause of both a dramatic increase in defense spending
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with these systems being a priority after nuclear weapons, and the termination of Russia’s defense reform
of 2008-11. The Russian press frequently comments
about the potential for U.S. aerospace attack both by
existing weapons and new ones in design like the X37B Orbital Aircraft.31 Increasingly Russian military
writers see the air and space attack from the United
States and/or NATO as an integrated operation, as in
Libya and Kosovo, and regard it as the primary operational threat to Russia.32 Since Russian analysts and
officials regard U.S. conventional precision-strike capabilities as being strategic ones in their impact, they
are not only striving to build an integrated aerospace
defense against them but to use the treaty process,
both in 2009-10 and in the future, as a means of reducing the threat.33
Indeed, so great is the perception of threat (before
Libya) that Russia, in complete contradiction to the
earlier defense reform’s stated goals of reducing a
bloated army and officer corps, created this new aerospace defense with 70,000 new officers at double pay,
even as it sharply raises procurement targets. A new
justification for this rise in defense spending, though it
was planned no later than 2010, is the NATO intervention or air operation in Libya that officials from Premier Putin on down now claim justifies this immense
expansion of defense spending. Thus a report on a
recent visit to the defense plant in Votkinsk observed
that:
Putin pointed out that the enormous sums being invested in the State Defence Order are being diverted
from other areas. And these sacrifices have to be justified. The state-of-the-art technologies that will emerge
in the OPK will subsequently cross over into civilian
sectors. And the events surrounding Libya also leave
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the premier in no doubt regarding the necessity for
and timeliness of the reinforcement of Russia’s defense might. All too readily do the United States and
its allies decide to employ armed force against sovereign states, Putin stressed.34

This argument also suggests that the Libyan operation will exact substantial costs upon the new reset policy of the Obama administration and Russo-American
relations. All this is happening even as Russia cannot
stop the insurgency that is inflaming the entire North
Caucasus, and as its economy as a whole stagnates.
Nor does it want to even study counterinsurgency to
deal with this threat or the equally serious potential
one of insurgency in Central Asia, as its response to
ethnic pogroms in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 illustrates.35
Clearly, Russia also sees nothing wrong with missile defenses that can presumably take out the U.S.
nuclear capability despite years of argumentation
against BMD. But this new branch of the armed forces
also shows the expectation of what Russian military
writers believe would be the decisive first strike by
U.S. and Allied forces, namely a conventional aerospace and missile attack supported by space-based
or space-traversing assets.36 Therefore, this enduring
mistrust and melange of asymmetric cognitive approaches between Washington and Moscow are not
simply a matter of differing ideas about the future
trajectory of arms control and nonproliferation discussions. Rather, they continue to reflect and to express
a fundamental clash of values that does not preclude
negotiated treaties on arms control—which, after all,
date back to 1963—but which seriously impedes the
process of reaching such accords.
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One major consequence of this presumption of
hostility that impedes, though it does not prevent, the
reaching of accords with Moscow is that deep-rooted
belief of the Russian leadership that due to this presumption of hostility, Russia must remain wedded
to a posture of mutual assured destruction, mutual
deterrence, and an almost literal and crude argument
in favor of the offense-defense reaction described in
earlier generations of writing on these subjects. From
Russia’s standpoint, the only way it can have security
vis-à-vis the United States given that presupposition
of conflict is if America is shackled to a continuation
of the mutual hostage relationship based on mutual
deterrence that characterized the Cold War, so that it
cannot act unilaterally. To the degree that both sides
are shackled to this mutual hostage relationship, Russia gains a measure of restraint or even of control over
U.S. policy. For as Patrick Morgan has observed, this
kind of classic deterrence “cuts through the complexities of needing to have a full understanding of or dialogue with the other side. Instead it enables a state, in
this case Russia, to “simplify by dictating, the opponent’s preferences.”37 (Italics in the original.) Thanks
to such a mutual hostage relationship, Russian leaders
see all other states who wish to attack them or even to
exploit internal crises like Chechnya as being deterred.
Therefore, nuclear weapons remain a critical component in the ensuring of strategic stability and, as less
openly stated, in giving Russia room to act freely in
world affairs.38
Russian Chief of Staff General Nikolai Makarov
warned that:
The factor of parity should be accompanied by the
factor of stability, if the U.S. missile defense begins to
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evolve; it will be aimed primarily at destroying our
nuclear missile capabilities. And then the balance of
force will be tipped in favor of the United States.…
With the existing and maintained parity of strategic
offensive means, the global missile defense being
created by the U.S. will be able to have some impact
on the deterrence capabilities of the Russian strategic nuclear force already in the medium term.…This
may upset the strategic balance of force and lower the
threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Although
missile defense is a defensive system, its development
will basically boost [the] arms race.39

Neither is this just rhetoric. A recent article also
points out that current Russian nuclear programs aim
to overcome or even neutralize U.S. missile defenses.
The impression is that the Kremlin no longer believes
in America’s military omnipotence. Russia responded
to the ultimatum with a maiden flight of its latest T-50
fighter and rearmament of its antiaircraft defense
system with T-400 Triumph complexes. (This may be
referring to what we call the S-400 SAM-author). To
all appearances, Triumphs are ASAT weapons also
capable of intercepting and destroying inbound ballistic warheads. Continuation of Bulava missile tests
was proclaimed as well. Work on the missile will be
brought to its logical end, sooner or later. Specialists
are even working on a concept of the future strategic
bombers that will replace TU-95s and Tu-160s one fine
day.40

Since Moscow rigorously adheres to this mutual
hostage concept, it cannot trust the United States,
and any unilateral U.S. advance in defenses must be
compensated by greater Russian offensive and defensive capabilities. For example, as noted above, missile
defenses should lead Russia to procure missiles that
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can evade any defense. The following citations demonstrate this deep-rooted belief in the mutual hostage
relationship, deterrence of the enemy, and the actionreaction process regarding armaments among the
Russian political and military leadership. First, Lavrov told an interviewer in February 2007 that:
Our main criterion is ensuring the Russian Federation’s security and maintaining strategic stability as
much as possible. . . . We have started such consultations already. I am convinced that we need a substantive discussion on how those lethal weapons could
be curbed on the basis of mutual trust and balance of
forces and interests. We will insist particularly on this
approach. We do not need just the talk that we are no
longer enemies and therefore we should not have restrictions for each other. This is not the right approach.
It is fraught with an arms race, in fact, because, it is
very unlikely that either of us will be ready to lag behind a lot.41

Here Lavrov signaled Russia’s unwillingness to
leave a mutually adversarial relationship with America and its presupposition of mutual hostility as reflected in both sides’ nuclear deployments. Similarly,
Alexei Arbatov then ridiculed the George H. Bush
administration’s view, stated by Ambassador Linton
Brooks, the former U.S. arms control negotiator, that
because the two sides are no longer adversaries, detailed arms control talks are no longer necessary, as
either naiveté or outright hypocrisy.42
Since then Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has stated that:
Issues of strategic offensive and defensive arms are
inextricably linked. To deny this relationship is meaningless because it is the essence of relations between
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the countries that have the appropriate potential in
both areas. An augmented capacity of one of the parties in the realm of missile defense is automatically
echoed in the form of plans and decisions of the other
party in the realm of strategic offensive arms. And
not even obliquely, but in the most direct way what is
happening in the field of missile defense and U.S. relations with its East European allies on this topic has an
impact on our START follow-on negotiations. Without
recognition of the relationship between strategic and
offensive defensive arms, there can be no such treaty,
it cannot take place.43

Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov
told the Munich Security conference in February 2010:
It is impossible to speak of reducing nuclear potentials
in earnest while a state that possesses nuclear weapons is developing and deploying systems of defense
against means of delivery of nuclear warheads that
other states possess. It is like the sword and shield
theory, where both are continuously developing with
the characteristics and resources of each of them being
kept in mind.44

Putin’s late 2009 remarks in Vladivostok fit right
into this outlook.
The problem is that our American partners are developing missile defenses, and we are not, . . . But the
issues of missile defense and offensive weapons are
closely interconnected. . . . There could be a danger
that having created an umbrella against offensive
strike systems, our partners may come to feel completely safe. After the balance is broken, they will do
whatever they want and grow more aggressive.45
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And this outlook has continued since the treaty
was signed. As part of its ratification process, the
Duma formally stated that both parties to the treaty
accept that strategic offensive wapons and defenses
are interrelated and that this relationship becomes
more important as reductions in offensive systems occurs.46 Similarly, Ivanov, speaking at the 2011 Munich
Security conference stated that the creation of missile
defenses leads to the development of strategic offensive weapon and thus a new arms race. Any efforts to
buld a shield inevitably lead to comparable efforts to
build a sword.47
REGIONAL SECURITY IN EURASIA IN
RUSSIAN THINKING
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that
many Russian writers rightly attribute the persistence
of deep mistrust despite our being 20 years past the
end of the Cold War to the frozen mentality of deterrence and/or the mentality of a containment policy.48
Thanks to all these factors that go into Russian thinking about arms control and nuclear weapons, the
linkages between competing regional security policies and programs in Eurasia, and the two states’ orientations to those issues, are invariably linked with
with the agenda of arms control and nonproliferation negotiations, to cite some obvious examples. The
current discussions on connecting Russia to the U.S.
and NATO missile defense programs or the linkage
between progress on the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) treaty negotiations and the issue of
TNW—including all of Russia—testifies to the abiding, if not growing, importance of these regional and
strategic linkages.
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In particular, for the Russian Federation this linkage between regional security and strategic agendas
has become a paramount feature of overall Russian
thinking about Russian security in both Europe and
Asia. As Jacob Kipp has written:
For Russia, which inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but has faced a serious change in its international
position, the nuclear equation is, in fact, shaped by
Russia’s status as a regional power in a complex Eurasian security environment, where nuclear issues are
not defined exclusively by the U.S.-Russian strategic
nuclear equation but by security dynamics involving
interactions with Russia’s immediate periphery. On
the one hand, Russia’s security responses have been
shaped by a post-Soviet decade of sharp internal political crises, economic transformation, social instability,
demographic decline, and the collapse of conventional
military power. The impact of these developments has
been uneven across Russia, leading to very distinct security environments which have demanded regional
responses. The initial focus of security concerns for
both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation
was primarily upon European security. This was the
primary focus of the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition
and the place where its militarization was most evident.49

Consequently, despite the treaty and the evident
satisfaction of both parties with the current course of
policy, the problems stemming from this fundamental
disparity between them have not been overcome, and
the reset policy is therefore subject to reversal, particularly if issues of regional security in Eurasia lead
one or both sides to revert back to the presupposition
of a conflicted relationship. If we are to understand
the cognitive mainsprings of Russian thinking and security policy, we must further clarify this point of the
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nexus between regional and global security in Russian
thinking and policy.
Fedor Lukyanov, like many others, has observed
that while Russia has lost its global perspective, it seeks
to retrieve it.50 Andrei Tsygankov further amplifies this
observation by stating that although Russia seeks to
remain a regional power in Europe, the Caucasus, and
Central and East Asia, it acts globally. In other words,
it uses its geographical location astride several key
Eurasian regions to force itself into both regional balances and thus leverage itself into being accepted as a
global actor. To the extent that it feels itself excluded,
as it did by the United States, from participating in
key regional security fora, policies, or institutions, it
pursues a policy of resistance using, among other instruments of power, its nuclear weapons.51 As a result,
and following Kipp’s remarks above, from Russia’s
standpoint there can be no purely regional crisis in
the key regions where it is situated or where it deems
itself to have important interests. Consequently, the
potential for any crisis to escalate, even against its
participants’ intentions, creates the ever-present possibility of a global crisis, if not conflict, where nuclear
arms provide either the background music or are the
primary instrumental soloists.52
This inherent linkage from the regional to the
global level also shapes Russian approaches to the future agenda of arms control. Apart from the perceived
linkages from regional to strategic level issues in
Moscow’s perspective, several prospective issues for
future negotiations are intrinsically linked in Russian
eyes. For example, the United States (and NATO) have
long since argued that the next round of arms control
treaty negotiations deal with the issues of TNW in Europe. Moscow has equally consistently rejected that
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stance, saying that countries owning or possessing
TNW must first remove them to their home territory
before any such talks could begin, thereby leaving Europe denuded of them. But now, according to Deputy
Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, Russia argues that, although it has repeatedly called on other nuclear states
to remove TNW from abroad and leave them at home,
restrict maneuvers with them on the territory of nonnuclear states, and disassemble structures for their
prompt deployment abroad, “nonstrategic nuclear
weapons grow increasingly outside NATO and Russia.” In his words North Korea, Pakistan, Israel, and
China are Russia’s neighbors and their TNW, particularly China’s, provide a threat.53 While Ivanov’s
remarks should enlighten us concerning what Russia
regards as its real strategic borders, what also is noteworthy that here is the announcement again, even if
implicitly, that China and Israel are potential enemies
and Pakistan is both a potential enemy and a proliferation threat.
Beyond the fact that this statement reflects a comparable presupposition of conflict with regard to all
these states from Moscow’s standpoint, Ivanov’s remarks also reflect Moscow’s posture that in any future round of arms control talks all nuclear states, not
least China, should be at the table.54 Makarov too has
advocated bringing all nuclear powers to the table in
the next negotiating round.55 The Foreign Ministry has
followed suit, saying the five major nuclear powers
must join the next round of arms reductions talks.56
Thus progress on TNW must somehow take account
of the growing threat Russia perceives from China’s
increasing TNW threat, as well as its steadily developing conventional missiles and forces.57 Other analogous linkages may well exist with regard to Russian
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perspectives on arms control issues. Again, for example, as Sam Nunn has argued, if there is to be success
on curbing proliferation of nuclear (and chemical and
biological) weapons, multilateral cooperation is essential. Thus other nuclear states must be fully committed partners.58 Therefore, virtually every conceivable
issue will play into the agenda of any future multilateral arms control negotiation, allowing any of those
states to obstruct nonproliferation measures to secure
its nuclear agenda, making cooperation on nonproliferation even more complicated than it has been in the
past.
Ivanov’s remarks fall into a broader context, namely that of the developing or growing Russian anxiety
about Chinese military power and Russia’s lack of
anything near an adequate conventional response to
it. There are multiplying signs of this anxiety and of
Russia’s efforts to reposture its conventional forces to
deal with it. But of course, ultimately the TNW and
other nuclear systems are the great equalizer in this
theater, i.e., the Russian Far East (RFE).59 By the time
Moscow published its new defense doctrine in 2010, it
had begun to consider the rise of China, not only as an
example that could be emulated but also as a potential
threat to the RFE. Thus the doctrine not only reiterated the by now long-standing invocation of a NATO
threat, it also added new threats that appear to be focused, albeit without saying so, on China. Specifically,
the 2010 doctrine cites a “show of military force with
provocative objectives in the course of exercises on the
territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation or its allies” and “stepping up the activities of
the armed forces of individual states (groups of states)
involving partial or complete mobilization and the
transitioning of these states’ organs and military command and control to wartime operating conditions.”60
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Commentators here and abroad interpreted this
language as pointing to the Russian perception of
an increased potential Chinese threat based on the
modernization of the Chinese armed forces and on
exercises in 2009 that seemed to presage a possible
mission directed against the RFE.61 Indeed, in 2009
commanders for the first time began to speak publicly,
undoubtedly with Moscow’s assent, about a genuine
military threat from China.62 So while one motive for
the Vostok-2003, and possibly the more recent Vostok
-2010, exercise may be connected with the need to
defend energy deposits in the RFE, a second motive
clearly had to do with the rise of China.63
Vostok-2010 ended with a simulated tactical nuclear weapon strike on China to repel a ground invasion
of Russia. Meanwhile, the extensive American coverage of China’s new stealth Fighter, the J-20 and its
naval construction program, including advanced antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), overlooks the fact that
all these capabilities could be used against Russia as
well. China has its own TNW, as well as thousands of
conventional and nuclear missiles that could easily be
targeted on Russia. As Kipp observed in 2010:64
A year ago, informed Russian defense journalists still
spoke of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] as a mass
industrial army seeking niche advanced conventional
capabilities. Looking at the threat environment that
was assumed to exist under Zapad 2009, the defense
journalist Dmitri Litovkin spoke of Russian forces
confronting three distinct types of military threats: “an
opponent armed to NATO standards in the GeorgianRussian confrontation over South Ossetia last year. In
the eastern strategic direction Russian forces would
likely face a multi-million-man army with a traditional approach to the conduct of combat: linear deployments with large concentrations of manpower and
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firepower on different axis. In the southern strategic
direction Russian forces expect to confront irregular
forces and sabotage groups fighting a partisan war
against ‘the organs of Federal authority,’ i.e., Internal
troops, the border patrol, and the FSB [Federal Security Service].”65 By spring of this year, a number of
those involved in bringing about the “new look” were
speaking of a PLA that was moving rapidly towards
a high-tech conventional force with its own understanding of network-centric warfare.66 Moreover, the
People’s Liberation Army conducted a major exercise
“Stride-2009” which looked like a rehearsal for military intervention against Central Asia and/or Russia
to some Russian observers.67

Beginning in 2009, overt discussions of the potential Chinese military threat began to surface in the
military press. These statements were deliberately
planned to call attention to Chinese military prowess.68 And they all pointed to the threat of an invasion,
not just by a large, multi-million man army, but also,
as Roger McDermott observes, to the example derived
from China’s military modernization that has led China to an informatizing, if not informatized, high-tech
capable military in just over a decade.69 In a dilapidated and remote theater that is an economy of force
theater with vast distances, inadequate infrastructure,
and a declining industrial and manpower base:
In the first instance, in any military conflict the Russian VVS (Air Forces) cannot guarantee air superiority against the Chinese. Moreover, they do not possess sensor-fused cluster munitions, though in theory
their surface-to-surface missiles (SSM’s) could deliver
cluster munitions depending on whether the missile troops remained intact long enough. Faced with
an advancing PLA division or divisions’ early use of
TNW would present a viable option.70
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In this context, what is particularly telling about
Russia and China’s relations regarding the Arctic and
Pacific energy deposits is the new trend in Russian naval policy; Russia’s new plans for naval construction,
especially in the RFE, also have access to the Arctic
in mind.71 Indeed, experts see the primary direction
or mission of four new directions for the fleet and
its new modernization program as being the protection of Russia’s access to oil, gas, and other mineral
reserves or deposits on Russia’s continental shelf. All
in all, 36 submarines and 40 surface ships are to be
added by 2020.72 But beyond this primary mission and
the other three directions for future naval construction, these plans betray a reorientation of Russia’s naval emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and to a new emphasis on meeting the challenge posed by China’s naval
buildup.73 This naval construction is supposed to help
Russia compensate for its vast conventional inferiority
in numbers and quality vis-à-vis China in the RFE.74
Here we should understand that Russia’s forces,
particularly those in the North and the Far East may
be deployed on a “swing basis” where either the Fleet
or air forces in one theater move to support the fleet or
air forces in the other. Russia has carried out exercises
whereby one fleet moves to the aid of the other under
such a concept.75 Likewise, Russia has rehearsed scenarios for airlifting ground forces from the North to
the Pacific in order to overcome the “tyranny of distance” that makes it very difficult for Russia to sustain
forces in Northeast Asia. And the revival of regular
air patrols over the oceans have clearly involved the
Pacific-based units of the long range aviation forces as
well as some of the air forces based in the north and
Arctic that fly in the areas around Alaska.76 Indeed,
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nuclear exercises moving forces or targeting weapons from the north to the Pacific or vice versa have
also occurred.77 To the degree that Arctic missions
become part of the regular repertoire of the Russian
armed forces, they will also to some degree spill over
into the North Pacific. This all preceded Vostok-2010.
Since then, China’s military program has continued
apace. Consequently, new Chinese developments like
the conventional Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
(IRBM) DF-16, the new ASBM, etc. threaten not just
the United States and its allies but also a whole range
of Russian military targets deep into Russia.78
RUSSIA’S FORCE MODERNIZATION AND
POSITIONS ON THE NEW NUCLEAR AGENDA
The foregoing perspectives are essential to understanding of Russian thinking as we discuss possibilities
for future arms control negotiations involving Russia.
In February-March 2011, Russian spokesmen outlined
Russia’s positions on almost all the outstanding issues
for a future arms control negotiation. Russia’s positions concerning the evolving nuclear agenda as well
as its ongoing weapons program reflect its assessment
not only of the situation created by the new treaty but
also its assessment of current or future threats and
longstanding Russian policy objectives.
First of all, Russia is currently undertaking its
newest in a series of long-term defense modernization projects. The State Armament Program submitted to Medvedev and the Duma for 2011-20 now totals
20.7 trillion rubles ($646 billion), of which 19.4 trillion
rubles goes to the needs of the Ministry of Defense.
Of that total, 79 percent will go to the acquisition and
purchase of high-tech armaments (including nuclear
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weapons, which remain a priority). This represents a
tripling of the current 2006-15 program that supposedly provides for delivery of 1,300 models of equipment
and armament, of which 220 require modernization or
creation of new capacities.79 Within this new program,
which also entails the comprehensive modernization of the entire machine tool sector along with the
high-tech sector, the state order (Goszakaz) for 2011
will go up by a third to 1.5 trillion rubles in 2011 and
then another third by 2013 to 2 trillion rubles.80 Right
now, there is a serious debate regarding the nuclear
sector. Many defense industry sectors possess the
ambition to virtually double ICBM (intercontinental
ballistic missile) production through 2020 by modernizing production lines and producing heavy liquidpropellant missiles and are spending nearly 77 billion
rubles towards these ends.81 Russia aims to modernize
its quantitative arsenal to conform to the new treaty’s
requirements. Furthermore, because it maintains that
the United States has not definitively settled upon a
missile defense model (which is strange given the administration’s policy), it allegedly needs to modernize
qualitatively to have designs that can counter space
weapons, a set of weapons that Moscow apparently
fully believes the United States intends to create.82
Therefore, one way to meet these demands is to
create a heavy liquid-propelled ballistic missile, an issue that has touched off a major debate among missile
designers with First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin supporting it, and Yuri Solomonov, a
famous missile designer at the Moscow Institute of
Thermal Technology, opposing it. In opposition to
the calls for this new missile are the designers of the
Topol-M, Yars, and Bulava solid propellant systems.
In other words, Russia’s nuclear program, although
work has started on the liquid-propellant system, is in
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the throes of a debate, so its final outcome and prognosis remain somewhat unclear at this time.83 Despite
this as yet unresolved debate, the current expectation is that the ultimate design will copy that of the
Satan (SS-18) ICBM and be insensitive to the effect of
an electromagnetic (EMP) impulse, launchable from a
silo even after a missile has hit it, and capable of carrying a large complex of defense penetration aids so
that it can evade missile defenses and deliver a 10ton combat payload to any point in the world. It also
will include 10 individually-guided warheads of the
megaton class, i.e., it will be a multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV).84 These plans date
back at least to 2008 when it was first announced that
the new RS-24 would be MIRVed.85
Meanwhile Deputy Defense minister Vladimir
Popovkin is moving forward and outlining a huge
Russian conventional and nuclear rearmament program through 2020.
Popovkin said Russia plans to develop a new liquidfueled heavy ICBM to carry up to ten warheads, and
having a service life of up to 35 years. Former RVSN
[Russian Strategic Missile Forces] Commander General-Lieutenant Andrey Shvaychenko talked about a
new liquid heavy missile as far back as late 2009, and
the issue’s been debated in the Russian military press
since. Popovkin said the Defense Ministry plans to accept the Bulava SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic
missle] and the first two Borey-class SSBNs [ship, submersible, ballistic, nuclear] this year. There will be 4-5
Bulava launches this year. Recall [that] to date only
7 of 14 Bulava tests have been successful. Addressing
the missile’s past failures, Popovkin said there were
many deviations from the design documentation during production. He also said Russia plans to build
eight SSBNs to carry Bulava by 2020. He was unclear
if this includes the first two Borey-class boats.86
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It is clear that this construction program contemplates, not just deterrence, but a war using nuclear
weapons, albeit in what is possibly a restricted number of contingencies but clearly premised on a U.S./
NATO attack. Indeed, as Popovkin said in another
interview, the first priority is the strategic deterrent,
which includes nuclear weapons, early warning, and
missile and aerospace defense (i.e., the new VKO
force).
The first priority [is] the strategic deterrent force. They
have two components: the strategic nuclear forces, as
well as a system of missile warning, missile defense
and aerospace defense. The second priority [is] a long
list of high-precision weapons, whose use is based on
information support from space. Third - automated
command and control systems [ACCS]. In the next 2
or 3 years, [it is proposed] to link all species of ACCS
in a single management system. Modernize it so it was
with an open architecture and it allows you to build
the capacity in any direction.87

Finally, as part of the nuclear program the General Staff commissioned research institutes to determine how many nuclear warheads are needed for a
guaranteed retaliatory strike against a potential enemy, presumably to confirm the General Staff’s earlier
insistence on 1,500 warheads as an irreducible minimum under present circumstances.88 These studies
and building programs obviously have a great deal of
bureaucratic muscle and financing behind them, so in
practical terms it will be very difficult to win Russian
assent to large reductions in strategic forces until and
unless other nuclear powers, including but in addition
to the United States, also agree to them. This makes
attaining the goal of nuclear zero anytime soon a very
dubious proposition.
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However, beyond this set of considerations, there
are also other reasons for suspecting that, despite the
effort to complete a huge conventional upgrading of
the Russian military, Russia in 2015-20 will continue
relying much more on nuclear weapons and nuclear
deterrence. Basically, it has already become clear that
defense industry, which has never been able to provide the armed forces with its requirements, has again
failed as of 2010. Recent articles make the extent of this
failure very clear. Specifically:
Last year, for example, they did not get a single nuclear submarine cruiser, although the Yuri Dolgoruky
with 12 Bulava missiles on board and a multirole
Yasen-class nuclear submarine were to have been commissioned at the very least, and only 5 out of 11 communications and reconnaissance satellites were sent
into space. Nor did the fleet get a project 20380 cor
vette. Only six out of nine Yak-130 aircraft planned for
delivery were received and just 78 out of 151 BMP-3
infantry fighting vehicles.89

Yet, typically, nobody received a public reprimand
for this confirming that “nonfulfillment of the Army’s
orders in the defense industry has become the norm for
our country.”90 Under the circumstances, the planned
modernization of the forces’ armaments remains an
equally dubious proposition. But, in turn, that raises
the question of how the military is to fulfill President
Medvedev’s 2008 directive that by 2020 Russia should
have:
A guaranteed nuclear deterrent system for various
military and political circumstances must be provided
by 2020. . . . We must ensure air superiority, precision
strikes on land and sea targets, and the timely deployment of troops. We are planning to launch large-scale
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production of warships, primarily, nuclear submarines with cruise missiles and multi-purpose attack
submarines. . . . We will also build an air and space
defense network.91

Furthermore, the planned conventional modernization also seemed to imply an interest in exploring
the possibilities for more sophisticated conventional
means of deterrence. Thus former Deputy Defense
Minister and current Duma member Andrei Kokoshin
called the Severodvinsk class of fourth generation nuclear powered but conventionally armed submarines a
non-nuclear deterrent, suggesting this interest in nonnuclear forms of deterrence and of a concept of deterrence “ladders,” some or most of which would only
require the use or display of conventional systems.92
Absent sufficient capabilities of this kind, Russia will
have little choice but to rely predominantly on nuclear
deterrence against the United States (NATO), China,
and potential proliferators in its vicinity. Yet as Medvedev and Defense Minister Serdyukov have publicly
said, Moscow will not even be able to reach the treaty’s limits for nuclear weapons by 2020, forcing it both
to modernize its existing arsenal, i.e., MIRVs, extend
existing weapons past that date, and hope for the best
regarding conventional systems until 2020.93 Therefore, the already visible failure of Russia’s modernization project adds another to a long series of question
marks that must be put against the idea of obtaining
serious nuclear reductions in the foreseeable future.
Indeed, Kokoshin has said that nuclear deterrence
will remain the keystone of Russian defense for the future, that there are no conceivable alternatives to nuclear deterrence even in the distant future (i.e., the presupposition of hostility with both the West and China,
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not to mention everyone else cited here, will continue
till then). Therefore Russia must continue modernizing its land, sea, and air-based nuclear weapons and
its tactical and operational-tactical nuclear systems,
too.94
RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEW TREATY
Russian perceptions of where it stands as a result
of the new treaty also represent an obstacle to progress because they are firmly ensconced in the matrix
of the mutual hostage and presumption of hostility
mentioned above. Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly
Antonov, who negotiated the treaty, calls it the gold
standard for future treaty negotiations.95 He and his
colleagues certainly regard it favorably but largely
because it reduced the U.S. threat and strengthened
Russia’s relative position, not that it enhanced international security. Lavrov echoed Antonov’s description of the treaty.96 Serdyukov stated that not only
does the treaty provide a guaranteed level of deterrence adequate to Russia’s security; it allows Russia to
update 70 percent of strategic carriers and warheads
or 90 percent of those belonging to the Strategic Missile Troops, while America must reduce its arsenal.
Like Lavrov, he said that if the United States continues to build missile defenses, the treaty allows Russia
to make “an adequate response, i.e., withdraw from
the treaty.”97 Medvedev’s national security advisor,
Sergei Prikhodko, voiced his approval of the clauses
limiting deployed delivery vehicles and launch systems and the incorporation of heavy bombers into
those categories that limit U.S. breakout potential, a
key Russian demand.98
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Other commentators cheered the reduction of inspection visits to each other’s facilities, which they regarded as burdensome and as a means of transmitting
intelligence data to Washington. Therefore, they also
cheered the elimination of the requirement for transmitting remote telemetry of test launches of news missiles for the same reasons. Russia also secured exemption for monitoring for road-mobile Topol land-based
ICBMs. Getting the United States to count some conventional carriers as strategic ones, equating them to
nuclear weapons in line with Russian assessments of
those systems, is another positive outcome from Russia’s point of view. Yet Russia’s capabilities for building up its arsenal were not affected. At the same time,
of course, the treaty was a compromise and reflected
some American gains, namely, safeguarding the missile defense program and on verification.99 Similarly,
Ruslan Pukhov, a noted defense commentator, observes that these benefits for Russia, along with the
overall reduction of both sides’ nuclear potential, is
very beneficial for Russia and that, “It is obvious that
this is not very beneficial for the U.S. on the whole.”100
Likewise, Alexei Arbatov argues that the treaty limits both U.S. nuclear and conventional strategic forces
and gives Russia means of leverage upon the United
States.101 For these reasons, given the Russian sense of
having won or at least prevailed in the negotiations, it
is hardly surprising that Antonov said further disarmament is contingent upon both sides implementing
the treaty (presumably with the hidden implication
that should the United States build defenses, Russia
might exercise its option for withdrawal).102 Unfortunately, it is precisely these Russian gains that have
aroused the ire of Republican opponents of the treaty
in the United States and underscores the continuing
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bilateral mistrust that could yet poison the reset policy
and future arms control talks, not to mention progress
towards a nuclear zero.
Finally, in advance of a new round of negotiations,
there is a decided difference in the contending approaches of Russia and the United States. As recently
reported in connection with Deputy Foreign Minister
Ryabkov’s recent visit to the United States:
While U.S. officials have focused publicly on a nuclear
treaty that would cover reducing the numbers of not
just strategic arms but also shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons, Ryabkov talked first about turning to
the control of conventional arms in Europe and reaching some predictability of forces on the continent. He
said shaping the military relationships on the ground,
where Russia has vastly fewer troops and less equipment, would relate to the future of nuclear disarmament. He [Ryabkov] talked about the difficulty of finding the correct “platform” for any future agreements,
saying that weapons in outer space, non-nuclear strategic weapons, other nuclear nations and missile defenses also have to be considered.103

This last impediment to future reductions and
progress to nuclear zero is hardly insurmountable in
and of itself. But added to the existing obstacles, and
to the pressure of unforeseen events like Libya, all of
these obstacles to further reductions represent serious
obstructions to negotiations toward that end. For example, in earlier statements Ryabkov also heightened
the importance of serious efforts to settle regional conflict that upset stability globally.104
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PROLIFERATION
The two outstanding and unresolved issues of
nuclear proliferation, Iran and North Korea, also pose
significant challenges to any enduring Russo-American reset policy, let alone amity and genuine cooperation on international security. Indeed, the two governments’ divergent approach to these issues reflects
wide conceptual and perceptual gaps between them.
It is safe to say that for almost 20 years, proliferation
has become a virtual obsession of U.S. policymakers
who, nonetheless, have little to show for this obsession. Indeed, we went to war in Iraq over this issue,
only to entrap ourselves. We see proliferation as jeopardizing the global and regional nuclear order, threatening U.S. allies in the Middle East and East Asia, and
deterring our ability to project conventional military
power throughout the world. But we do not really focus on the regional security dynamics of these issues
in the way that Moscow does. Instead, Russia views
these issues primarily as regional security challenges
or in that context where the linkages discussed above
between regional security in key areas and Russian
national security assume mounting importance. Given Russia’s ambitions to challenge the United States
regionally through the formation of counterbalances
to it, the result is a set of contending issues where Russia sees us as threatening principles and interests that
it deems central to its security.
Moscow firmly opposes adding new members to
the nuclear club and regards proliferation as a threat.
Therefore it has worked with Washington to eliminate “loose nukes” and to discourage new states in
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or
former Warsaw Pact members from expanding earlier
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nuclear programs. It has steadily (at least rhetorically)
claimed that it is seeking to channel Iran’s nuclear program into one supervised by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).105 Russia has also established
controls over foreign economic operations with nuclear materials, special non-nuclear materials and corresponding technologies, as well as dual-use goods and
technology, principally as a component of the policy
of nonproliferation. The Export Control Law, adopted
in 1999, has locked in the term “Export Control” specifically for this sphere. The 1995 Law on national regulation of foreign trading activities described Export
Control as the full set of measures for the implementation of a “transfer procedure” for agreed-upon goods,
technologies, and services. The 1999 law codified this
term as “foreign trading, investment, and other activities, including production cooperation in the field
of the international exchange of goods, information,
work, services, and results of intellectual activities,
including exclusive rights to them (intellectual property).” This means not only the export of goods and
technologies abroad, but also their transfer to a foreigner within the territory of the Russian Federation.
In January 1998, the Russian government introduced
rules for “all-encompassing control” (catch-all).106
Nonetheless, Moscow has repeatedly stated that
on nonproliferation issues it follows its own interests.
While Russia regards proliferation as a threat, it comes
fifth in Russia’s new defense doctrine after a whole
series of U.S.-inspired threats like NATO enlargement
and missile defenses. Moreover, the doctrine explicitly states that Russia expects that by 2020 it will be
living in a proliferated world.107 In early 2002, Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov outlined Russian thinking and
policy concerning proliferation.
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Russia scrupulously adheres to its international obligations in the sphere of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, means of their delivery, and corresponding technologies. The key criteria of Russian
policy in this sphere are our own national security, the
strengthening of our country’s international positions
and the preservation of its great power status.108

Therefore, Russia evaluates proliferation issues not
according to whether the regime is democratic or not,
but on the basis of whether a country’s nuclearization
would seriously threaten Russia and its interests.109 In
commenting on President Putin’s June 2007 proposal
to let the Americans jointly manage the Russian missile defense radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, Chief of Staff
General Yuri N. Baluyevsky stated that Washington’s
claim that Russia now admitted to an Iranian threat
was a misinterpretation. While Russia never denied a
global threat of nonproliferation of missiles and nonproliferation, “we insist that this trend is not something catastrophic, which would require a global missile defense system deployed near Russian borders.”110
More recently, Serdyukov stated that, “We don’t share
all the West’s views on the capacities of the Iranian
nuclear program.”111 Likewise, Lavrov and his Deputy
Sergei Ryabkov state that though sanctions might become inevitable if Iran does not comply with the IAEA
regarding enrichment of uranium; Iran represents no
threat to Europe or America. Moreover, Moscow has
no evidence of its planning a military nuclear program that would justify missile defenses.112 Moscow’s
continuing opposition to U.S. missile defenses partly
stems from that outlook.
Accordingly, Moscow tends to view American
policy towards nonproliferation in jaundiced fash37

ion, displaying a visible Schadenfreude when North
Korea tested missiles and then a nuclear weapon in
July and October 2006.113 Or Russian officialdom often
views Washington’s insistence on nonproliferation
controls as mainly an effort to pressure competitors in
the nuclear and arms markets.114 Russia’s new defense
doctrine openly says that the number of states having nuclear weapons will increase.115 While this might
be regarded as a negative trend, it is certainly strange
to concede proliferation in advance of the fact. At the
same time, Russian leaders also publicly say that this
is mainly a U.S., not necessarily a Russian, concern.
Alexei Arbatov’s 2009 analysis of Russian thinking
about proliferation represents the most detailed explication of Russia’s approach. As Arbatov notes:
For Russia the acquisition of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan and the prospects of further proliferation are adding some new elements to a familiar and old threat, rather than creating a dramatic new one, as is the case with the United
States. The USSR and Russia have learned to live with
this threat and to deal with it on the basis of nuclear
deterrence, some limited defenses (like the Moscow
BMD system and national Air Defenses) and through
diplomacy, which is used to avoid direct confrontation (and still better, to sustain normal relations) with
new nuclear nations.116

Other analysts confirm that Russia responded to
Indo-Pakistani proliferation in a low-key manner and
that Russian elites still regard America as the only or
most likely potential adversary.117 Instead, Moscow
regards vertical proliferation (qualitative improvement) as opposed to horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states with greater alarm than
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does the United States. Russia’s posture thus reverses
America’s that takes greater alarm at horizontal proliferation.118
So while nuclear and missile proliferation are serious Russian security issues, not least because of
Russia’s geographical proximity to all existing and
potential proliferators, Russia does not profess undue alarm at this trend. Unlike America, it advances
no claim to be a global “policeman,” does not deploy
military sites or armed forces abroad (except in some
post-Soviet states) and does not employ its forces in
serious combat operations. In fact, Russia’s greatly reduced conventional power capabilities, coupled with
its expansive geopolitical ambitions, are leading it to
become a major exporter of sensitive nuclear technologies to would be proliferators as it seeks to reduce
U.S. influence in world politics.119 Thus it avoids challenging other countries, including actual or potential
nuclear and missile-capable regimes. Due to Russia’s
vulnerability and lack of reliable security protection
and commitments from other nations, its nonproliferation stance is much more cautious and flexible than
that of the United States. Indeed, it sees the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran as
potential partners, not enemies, and therefore will not
categorically oppose their programs, as does Washington.
Moreover, given Russia’s post Cold War weakness,
it has been forced to confront other security threats
that are incomparably more urgent to it than proliferation. These threats, as listed by Arbatov, comprise:
•	The instability and bloody conflicts across the
post-Soviet space and in the North Caucasus
of Russia proper (which has a 1,000 kilometer
(km) common border with the volatile South
Caucasus).
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•	NATO’s continuous extension to the east
against strong Russian objections.
•	Continuing stagnation of Russian armed forces
and defense industries and Russia’s growing
conventional and nuclear inferiority to the
United States and NATO.
•	The threat of expanding Muslim radicalism in
the Central Asia (7,000 km of common border
with Russia).
•	The scary growth of economic and military
power of China (5,000 km of common border
with Russia).
•	The United States plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe.120
Arbatov further observes that:
There is a broad consensus in Russia’s political elite
and strategic community that there is no reason for
their nation to take U.S. concerns closer to heart than
its own worries - in particular if Washington is showing neither understanding of those problems of Russia, nor any serious attempts to remove or alleviate
them in response for closer cooperation with Russian
on non-proliferation subjects. 121

Finally, Iran is an extremely important geopolitical
partner of Russia’s, a growing “regional superpower”
that balances out the expansion of Turkey and the
increasing U.S. military and political presence in the
Black Sea/Caspian region and Middle East, and simultaneously contains Sunni Wahhabism’s incursions
in the North Caucasus and Central Asia.122 Russia also
views Iran as the dominant regional power in the
neighborhood who can project power into the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Therefore,
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Moscow values Iran’s refraining from doing just that
by its pro-Iranian policies.123 Likewise, Russia does
not take the proliferation threat nearly as seriously as
does the United States and its allies in Europe and the
Middle East.124 Consequently it views the current situation in Iran and North Korea quite differently than
does the United States.
Iran.
For the United States, Iran is the primary test case
of Russian support for nonproliferation, and the current administration, like its predecessor, has invested
enormous time and effort in obtaining Russian support. The administration evidently believes that America needs Russian support to curb Iran’s proliferation
threat and obviously this dictates some concessions to
Russia in return for its support of U.S. efforts. According to administration spokesmen like Michael McFaul
of the National Security Council, if Russia wanted
an adversarial relationship with the United States on
Iran, there are many things that it could do to but has
not done to worsen the U.S. situation there.125 President Obama has voiced his optimism that the United
States, with Russian (and Chinese) cooperation will
secure “tough, strong sanctions” on Iran.126
Despite the reset policy’s gains whereby Russia
has refrained from selling Iran the S-300 and voted for
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution
1964 imposing sanctions on Iran, this ongoing crisis
underscores the divergent perspectives between Moscow and Washington. But it also demonstrates how
Russia utilizes the Iranian issue as part of its approach
to the United States. Thanks to the reset policy, the
administration has at least for now substantially al-
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tered the correlations between U.S.-Russia and RussoIranian relations by demonstrating to Moscow that it
can make gains with the United States in return for
more distancing from Iran. Clearly, Russia’s decision
made in September 2010 to cancel the sale of the S-300
anti-air missile to Iran closely correlates with the improvement of Moscow’s ties to Washington.127 Thus
in September 2010, Moscow invoked the United Nations (UN) sanctions resolution for which it voted as
grounds for terminating the sale of the S-300 and even
returning the money paid for it to Iran, despite the fact
that it could have exempted such sales and stay within
the language of the resolution.128 Indeed, earlier Russian and Chinese pressure had led the United States
to weaken its originally intended list of sanctions directed against Iran.129 So, clearly, the administration’s
belief that it had an understanding with the Russian
government was validated by the decision to terminate the sale of the S-300. As a result, the administration may well argue that its stance is justified by Russia’s termination of the sale of the S-300 to Iran.130
As Arbatov also observes, unlike America, Russia does not view North Korea and Iran as potential
enemies. Iran is a major consumer of Russian arms,
which helps the military-industrial sector to survive,
given many years of limited defense orders for the
Russian armed forces. Finally, Iran is an extremely
important geopolitical partner of Russia’s, a growing
“regional superpower” that balances out the expansion of Turkey and the increasing U.S. military and
political presence in the Black Sea/Caspian region
and Middle East, and simultaneously contains Sunni
Wahhabism’s incursions in the North Caucasus and
Central Asia.131 Russia also views Iran as the dominant
regional power in the neighborhood who can project
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power into the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian
Gulf. Therefore, Moscow, by its pro-Iranian policies,
values Iran’s refraining from doing so.132 Likewise,
Russia does not take the proliferation threat nearly as
seriously as does the United States and its allies in Europe and the Middle East.133
For example, diplomat Gleb Ivashentsov, then Director of the Second Asia Department in the Russian
Foreign Ministry, told a Liechtenstein Colloquium on
Iran in 2005 that:
Iran today is probably the only country in the greater
Middle East that, despite all of the internal and external difficulties, is steadily building up its economic,
scientific, technological, and military capability.
Should this trend continue, Iran—with its seventy
million population, which is fairly literate, compared
to neighboring states, and ideologically consolidated,
on the basis of Islamic and nationalist values; with a
highly intellectual elite, with more than eleven percent
of the world’s oil and eighteen percent of natural gas
reserves; with more than 500,000 strong armed forces
and with a strategic geographic position enabling it
to control sea and land routes between Europe and
Asia—is destined to emerge as a regional leader. This
means that the Islamic Republic of Iran will be playing
an increasing role in resolving problems not only in
the Middle East and Persian Gulf area but also in such
regions that are rather sensitive for Russia as Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Caspian region. This is
why dialogue with Iran and partnership with it on a
bilateral and regional as well as a broad international
basis is objectively becoming one of the key tasks of
Russia’s foreign policy.134
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Similarly Matthew Kroenig has more recently
written that:
In fact, Russia and China have not been willing to
authorize tough sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, not primarily because they have important economic interests in country as many analysts believe,
but because they are not particularly threatened by
Iran’s nuclear development. Russia and China are not
currently operating military forces in the Middle East
and, given the degradation of Russia’s military since
the end of the Cold War and China’s military modernization focusing on a Taiwan Straits contingency,
it is very unlikely that these countries will have the
capability to do so for the foreseeable future. For this
reason, they do not need to worry that nuclear proliferation in Iran will constrain the military freedom
of action. They might be concerned that Iran could
attack them in the bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear strike,
or provide nuclear weapons to terrorists who might
target them, but such scenarios are extremely unlikely.
In sum, Beijing and Moscow have very little to fear
from nuclear proliferation in Iran. They are unwilling
to place serious pressure on Tehran and are willing to
continue economic relations with the country, given
that many strategic thinkers in Russia and China believe that what is bad for Washington must be good
for Moscow and Beijing, some foreign officials undoubtedly welcome Iranian nuclear development as a
means of tying down the United States. 135

Yet Iran still defies the IAEA, enriches uranium,
and builds new nuclear centers.136 Nonetheless, in
August 2010 Moscow completed the Bushehr reactor
and opened it to production, lest it lose Iranian cooperation and the huge sums invested there. Bushehr’s
opening underscores the continuing unilateralism of
Russia’s Iran policy and the limited scope or cooperation with Washington on that issue.
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Neither have Iran’s sharp polemics on the S-300 nor
Moscow’s threat of sanctions should Iran fail to accept
enrichment outside Iran and IAEA monitoring led to
any sign that Moscow will support truly meaningful
sanctions on Iran. Indeed, when after the June 2010
UNSC resolution, the United States and the European
Union (EU) imposed their own further sanctions on
Iran, Moscow called those new sanctions “unacceptable” and warned again that the use of force could
lead to disaster.137 In mid-July, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and Iranian Oil Minister Masoud
Mirkazemi jointly announced a 30-year road map for
bilateral cooperation in oil and gas.138 The large deals
mapped out as part of that partnership include cooperation on the transportation, swaps, and marketing of natural gas; sales of petroleum products and
petrochemicals, and Russia’s establishment of a $100
million liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant to supply
remote regions of Iran.139 Shmatko made it clear that
Russia would not accept sanctions other than those of
the UNSC, that those sanctions did not apply to this
new deal, and that Russia would not be hindered by
the existing sanctions in drawing up energy cooperation plans with Iran. Indeed, he saw no limits to bilateral energy cooperation. Russia also apparently was
involved in May in trying to broker an Irano-TurkishBrazilian deal to swap low-enriched uranium fuel for
higher enriched fuel for medical reactors.140
Despite warnings to Iran, Moscow still formally
opposes “paralyzing sanctions,” the only kinds that
make sense. Medvedev speaks of “smart sanctions”
and clarified to Washington the limits of what Russia will support to meet the twin objectives of inducing Iran to stop enrichment and weaponization; and
second, to advance Russian interests.141 Moreover, the
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smart sanctions that Moscow now advocates would
not amount to an arms or energy embargo on Iran.
Even now Lavrov and Ryabkov state that though sanctions might become inevitable if Iran does not comply
with the IAEA regarding enrichment of uranium, Iran
represents no threat to Europe or the United States.
Moreover, Moscow has no evidence of Iran planning
a military nuclear program that would justify missile
defenses.142 Similarly, Andranik Migranyan, Director
of the Kremlin-backed Institue for Democracy and Cooperation in New York said that Russian cooperation
with the United States on further sanctions against
Iran is “highly unlikely.” He further stated that for the
United States to get Russian support Moscow would
have to be “duly compensated,” i.e., bribed, by ceasing NATO enlargement, missile defense deployments,
the rearming of the Georgian Army, “blunt and unceremonious interference” in the internal affairs of the
new republics, and any assistance to political forces
who are hostile to Russia.143 In other words, Russia
will distance itself from Iran to the degree that Washington guarantees it undisputed hegemony in the CIS
and Eurasia. Most recently, Russia now objects to the
publication of a new UN report on Iran describing
Iranian violations of UN sanctions resolutions against
it.144
While Russia professes to oppose Iranian nuclearization (and supports the plan to bring Iranian nuclear
spent fuel to Russia), it has been a prime supporter
of the process, exporting scientists and technologists
to Iran throughout the 1990s and providing major assistance for Iran’s conventional weapon, space, and
missile programs.145 Some recent reports actually allege the existence of a long-term high-level Russian
program to smuggle weapons clandestinely into Iran,
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using the Algerian and Syrian governments, Kurdish
terrorists, and members of Russian organized crime
in Spain.146 Moreover, many Russians have persuaded
themselves that Washington owes Moscow something
in regard to Europe and the Middle East.147
Clearly, it seems that key sectors like the energy
and arms sectors in Moscow are impeding any effort
to cooperate with Washington. This bears out what we
have said above. In particular, we see a time-honored
Russian negotiating tactic. As Vladimir Socor writes:
First, Moscow approved the sanctions resolution after almost two years of procrastination, watering it
down and leaving the S-300 issue ambiguous. During
this time the Obama Administration saw its leeway in
Eurasia constrained by the quest for Russian support
against Iran. In the next stage (now) implementation
turns out to be subject to a Russian “mechanism” yet
to be defined (to be negotiated). Classically Russia
makes a deal cashing in a quid-pro-quo, only to start
negotiating again for the deal’s implementation subject to some other quid-pro-quo. In the third stage, it
will be up to Russia’s president to list the sanctionsbanned weapons, and by the same token, to omit certain items, leaving Russia free to deliver these to Iran.
Thus the Kremlin will ultimately interpret the UN Security Council resolution on the S-300’s and not only
on this issue.148

It is not difficult to decipher what quid-pro-quos
Moscow now seeks. According to Fedor Lukyanov:
There will be no automatic agreement by Russia to
toughen the sanctions. In Moscow’s opinion, it has already gone very far as it is; . . . But Russia’s support of
the sanctions in May and generally the marked change
in position in the last six months are above all the result of the “exchange” of the Iranian question for no
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deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe. For
Moscow to go further, a new understanding is needed,
although at this point it is unclear on what. A great
deal depends on the ratification of the START treaty; if
its ratification in the US Senate fails, that will have an
effect on all the related topics, including Iran.149

This is now an urgent question, as Iran claims to
have obtained S-300 missiles and is moving ahead
on its satellite and nuclear programs to the best of its
ability.150 Although Russia has denied selling or transferring these missiles, as has Ukraine; if these claims
are true, the missiles could only have come from Russia and/or through the support of some third party
like Belarus and Ukraine, which Russia has used in
the past to sell abroad weapons with which it did not
want to be publicly associated. Moreover, it is clear
to any observer that Russia’s arms sales program is
riddled with massive corruption that could conceivably allow for such sales to occur.151
This outlook should not have eluded U.S. commentators for, as John Parker observes in his masterful study of Russo-Iranian relations:
No matter how much Russia and the United States
might share security concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and expanding influence in the Middle East, a
common approach by Washington and Moscow was
always undercut by Russia’s rivalry with the United
States other interests in Iran, and the historical approach to dealing with that country.152

That historical approach, as Parker demonstrates,
is one that recognized that Russia must always have
close relations with Iran as a neighbor, even though it
could ultimately represent a threat to Russia because
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of its missile and nuclear programs. Indeed, already in
1993, Moscow recognized that those programs could
represent a threat to its territory, neighbors, and vital interests.153 This is one reason why the Russian
government has continued to sell Iran weapons after
1992: precisely because it recognized that Iran had the
potential to disrupt the Caucasus, Central Asia, and
even possibly Afghanistan, Moscow realized that it
had to blend arms sales with close monitoring by its
security service in regard to Iranian activities.154 Economic calculations to keep defense industry markets
and preserve that sector, in addition to Russia’s longstanding and probably not unfounded belief that if it
did not sell weapons to Iran, Europe and the United
States would do so, also drive Moscow’s large arms
sales program to Iran. Therefore, arms sales to Iran
have always been an arrow in Moscow’s quiver to
prevent Iran from pursuing a policy of interference in
the border regions, and it has succeeded handsomely
from Russia’s point of view.155 To openly renege on
outstanding contracts, e.g., the S-300 surface to air
missile, would not only cause financial losses and Iranian anger and distrust of Russian promises, it could
also open the door to Iranian retaliation. Therefore,
Russia has found it difficult to take Western concerns
seriously.
Indeed, if we understood Russian policy correctly,
we would not invest misplaced hopes in them. Russian commentary on the recent oil and gas and nuclear
energy agreements indicates this. First, it appears that
one reason why Russia finally finished the Bushehr
project is because of its fears that Iran might conclude
a deal with other providers of peaceful nuclear energy,
e.g., Japan.156 This determination not to allow others to
replace Russia in Iranian calculations fully comports
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with 20 years of policy delineated by Parker. Second,
Russian official and expert commentary on Bushehr
reveals Moscow’s stance on Iran quite clearly. Officials and experts say this collaboration represents a
diplomatic victory for Russian diplomacy, carries no
risks for Russia, shows Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear
energy, supposedly keeps Iran in the nonproliferation
regime thereby saving the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) even as it advances Russia’s standing and interests, recovers Russia’s reputation as a stable and
reliable partner of Iran, is a purely economic deal with
no political significance, yet also shows that Moscow
can independently defy the United States with impunity (obviously a contradiction here), and can lead to
future deals, as Iran has proposed a consortium for
joint assembly of nuclear fuel.157
Even if we take the termination of the S-300 sale
into account, it does not change the analysis. Moscow
repeatedly warned Iran that its noncooperation was
endangering the sale of the weapon; moreover, it came
under substantial pressure from both Israel and the
United States, and it was widely believed that selling
the S-300 to Iran would trigger an Israeli air strike, the
last thing Moscow wants.158 As we have shown above,
the gains it might make from selling the missile were
negligible and the costs high, not least the costs of not
getting what it wants from Washington. Nonetheless, it has left the door open for future collaboration
with Iran on arms sales and other issues if it negotiates with the United States, EU Three, and Russia in a
5 + 1 framework.159
Even if this termination of the S-300 enraged Iranian elites, from Moscow’s standpoint, the recent energy deals clearly stabilized Russo-Iranian relations
while removing Russia from collaboration beyond
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a certain point with Washington, showing that the
“U.S. reset with Russia on Iran is the shakiest leg of
its Iran policy.”160 It also suggests that Russia wants
to tie the United States down with Iran, while it advances on other fronts and keeps raising the ante for
its cooperation as it improves its ties to Iran at U.S.
expense.161 Nonetheless, both Russian and foreign
analysts acknowledge that the apparent turn towards
restoring or at least restabilizing ties to Iran comes
at the expense of the reset policy and could mark its
symbolic end.162 Clearly, the road to Tehran does not
lead through Moscow.163
Obviously Russia’s robust economic interests in
Iran and the nuclear, energy, and defense industry
lobbies that benefit from those interests greatly influence Moscow’s policies. But beyond those lobbies,
Russia’s fundamental strategic interests lie in promoting Irano-U.S. hostility, not cooperation. Official
Russian statements advocate strengthening Iran’s role
as a legitimate actor in a Middle East security system
even as Iranian leaders threaten to destroy Israel and
promote state-sponsored terrorism. Foreign Minister
Lavrov went beyond this and said that Iran should
even be invited to participate in any security system
for the Black Sea region!164 Moscow’s recent call for a
nuclear free Middle East is, in this connection, essentially a propaganda stunt. This call is directed explicitly against Israel, whose assumed nuclear program
has never been seen by Middle Eastern governments
as a threat requiring them to do anything.165 However,
since Iran’s program went into high gear Moscow has
offered 13 Arab states nuclear reactors to advance its
economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East, hardly a contribution to nonproliferation.166
Indeed, Moscow has been feverishly trying to sell
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reactors abroad, even to potential proliferators like
Myanmar, for years.167
For over a decade, Russian pundits and officials
have openly stated that they want Iran to be a partner
of Russia and not the United States, lest the United
States consolidate its position as the leading foreign
power in the Middle East, where Moscow still desperately desires to be seen as a great power capable of
influencing regional policy. Irano-American hostility
precludes such consolidation and permits Russia to
exercise influence by supporting the maintenance of
a system of controlled tension there. Second, Iranian
rapprochement with the West undermines Russia’s
use of the energy weapon to subvert European security
institutions and governments because large quantities
of Iranian gas and oil would then be shipped to Europe. An Iranian reorientation to the West would also
likely stimulate foreign investment to and access from
Central Asia through Iran to the Persian Gulf and the
Indian Ocean, allowing the free flow of Central Asian
energy to the entire world, bypassing Russia and undermining its ability to control Eurasian energy flows.
Recent Russian statements confirm this assessment. Even though Moscow is quite unhappy with
Iranian stonewalling, it refuses to support the idea
of extending sanctions, still calls for negotiating with
Iran in order to ease the burden of sanctions upon
Iran, and rejects “unilateral” (i.e., Western and U.S.)
sanctions on Iran. Key figures like Prime Minister
Putin and NATO ambassador Dmitry Rogozin deny
that Iran has shown signs of having a military nuclear
program. Meanwhile, Russia’s arms sales agency, Rosoboroneksport, still holds out the possibility of selling nonsanctioned weapons to Iran.168 While RussoIranian relations have eroded due to the sanctions and
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Russia’s tougher line, formally Iran still holds out, as
does Russia, prospects for renewed cooperation. Indeed, though Medvedev calls Iran’s policy unreasonably tough and has warned that it is getting closer to
producing nuclear weapons, his government seems
not to have gotten that message, and even he calls energy cooperation with Iran promising.169 And Lavrov
has added that sanctions have run their course and
that “any new proposals would basically be aimed at
suffocating the Iranian economy.”170 So presumably
Moscow will oppose further sanctions against Iran.
In other words, Moscow has again tried to have its
cake and eat it too. Therefore, the presumption that
we can expect any genuinely serious cooperation from
Moscow beyond the present limit regarding Iran that
brings Iran to halt its program is unfounded, even
mischievous. Certainly we cannot expect that the
Russian government will accept any linkage between
arms control issues and Iran, as it has already rejected
that stance.171 But we can probably expect linkage to
getting America to retreat further in Eurasia, whether
it is missile defense or the integration of those borderlands into the West.
Korea.
The other proliferation threat is North Korea. Moscow’s regional calculus and effective power to help us
here is limited and very different from its role vis-àvis Iran. Yet it might offer possibilities for the United
States to advance its interests, if Washington plays
its cards right. Neither Washington nor Moscow has
much, if any, leverage over North Korean policy. Indeed, the DPRK possibly could disintegrate from internal failure even as it possesses nuclear weapons or
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alternatively it could, through miscalculation or deliberate policy, trigger war. Already in September 2010,
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin,
Moscow’s delegate to the Six-Party Talks, said that the
Korean peninsula was on the brink of war, something
nobody else has said in public.172
Today the Six-Party process is moribund, if not
dead. China has made a proposal to resume negotiations first between the two Korean states, followed
by a DPRK-U.S. negotiation, and then resumption of
the full Six-Party Talks. But Seoul has yet to approve
this plan formally or renounce its demand for North
Korean apology for sinking its ship (the Cheonan) last
year or for initiating firing on Yeonpyeong island in
November 2010.173 Most recently, Russian diplomatic
observers appeared to pour cold water on any resumption of the Six-Party Talks because of what looks like
insuperable divergences between Seoul and Pyongyang that would preclude even their meeting anytime
soon.174 Even before this period, several observers
had begun to criticize the Six-Party process for failing
to achieve its task, but that criticism has only grown
since then.175 Indeed, Niklas Swanstrom of Sweden’s
Institute for Development and Policy flatly says the
process is dead.176 This stagnation of the Six-Party process preceded the latest Korean crisis generated by the
announcement that North Korea has a uranium enrichment plant much more sophisticated than anyone
believed (probably greatly assisted by foreign powers) and North Korea’s shelling of the South Korean
island of Yeonpyeong in November 2010. But the process’ stagnation was visible even before the Cheonan
incident of March 2010 when North Korea torpedoed
a South Korean ship. North Korea is also reportedly
preparing a third nuclear test.177 Since previous tests
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have led to ruptures in the process and to UN resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea (which
apparently surprised Pyongyang), another test, especially in the current climate, will likely further delay if
not kill the resumption of Six-Party Talks.
While many reasons exist for this stagnation, because of this apparent breakdown of the process all
these reasons have combined to bring about the growing intransigence of the major parties. Indeed, China’s
aforementioned proposal reflects the inutility of previous structures like the Six-Party process. This intransigence strongly suggests that, absent a major change
in one of the key participants’ policies, no change is in
sight even though continuation of this impasse promises no relief of the current crisis for any of the six
parties. But without major changes, the next crisis is
liable to be much more dangerous, as South Korea has
now publicly announced that it will retaliate in force
against new attacks.178 And the advent of this uranium
enrichment plant opens up the possibility for North
Korea to begin building many more nuclear bombs.179
Thus there is good reason for mounting concern.
North Korea, too, now talks of the situation as being
on the brink of war, and South Korea has pledged retaliation for any future Northern provocations.180 The
current crisis reminds us of the dangers that are constantly present in the area and of the many reasons
for vigilance regarding North Korea. Even though the
succession of Kim Jong Un has so far progressed without incident, we cannot take the enduring stability of
North Korea for granted.
This is more than the habitual warning of many observers that North Korea will or should collapse. Many
signs point to a genuine possibility of internal ferment
within North Korea even apart from a possible suc-
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cession crisis. The outbreak of a major domestic crisis,
whether or not it is tied to foreign challenges, could
destabilize North Korea and lead to very grave and
unforeseen crises.181 For example, while many argue
that incidents like the Cheonan affair may be driven
by the exigencies of the succession issue in North Korean politics, i.e., the need to elicit military support for
the heir; succession to Kim Jong-Il, as many experts
know, could quite easily trigger internal and/or external clashes in and around the DPRK that could easily drag the outside powers into conflict, and North
Korean military risk taking on this scale ranks high
among those possible contingencies.182 In addition,
many signs point to a genuine possibility of internal
ferment within North Korea even apart from the succession crisis.
All this occurs in the context of the apparent ascendancy of North Korean hardliners and the military.
Given the looming succession crisis and inflation,
along with this ascendancy of anti-reform and pronuclear elements, this hardening policy line undermines prospects for a more accommodating foreign
policy even if Pyongyang returns to the Six-Party
Talks. Beyond the regime’s efforts to clamp down at
home lies the fact that many indicators point to what
Soviet historians might have called a revolutionary
crisis in North Korean society. Defections, corruption,
riots when the 2009 currency reform was introduced,
jailbreaks, the breaking of the regime’s information
monopoly, and a precarious food situation are all hallmarks of a potential that could erupt if there is a break
in leadership or elite cohesion. Alternatively, elites
who lose out may defect or seek to overturn that result. Indeed, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have already confidentially discussed uni-
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fication scenarios.183 Meanwhile, the present impact
of these trends that commingle decline and domestic
hardening undermines prospects for a more accommodating foreign policy even if Pyongyang returns to
the Six-Party Talks.
Second, foreign discussions concerning Pyongyang’s motives for precipitating the crises of 2010 also
are deeply disturbing. The many media commentaries
attempting to ascertain North Korea’s motives usually
divide into the following explanations, some of which
may overlap as being multiple causes for its behavior. Analyses focusing on domestic determinants of
the DPRK’s actions claim that that the regime is acting because it needs to get the military’s support for
Kim Jong Un in the current succession. The price for
this support is to conduct aggressive moves against
the United States and South Korea and demonstrate,
e.g., through the enrichment facility, that North Korea will never renounce nuclear weapons.184 That denouement, in turn, vitiates any prospect for resuming
the Six-Party Talks because from Washington’s, if not
Tokyo’s and Seoul’s, viewpoints, this North Korean
stance means there is nothing to talk about in these
negotiations.
The assessments that emphasize foreign policy
drivers claim (and there is no necessary contradiction
between them and the analyses stressing domestic
factors) that North Korea is employing its habitual
tactics to force the United States to take it seriously
and engage it in bilateral negotiations and possibly
also is simultaneously trying to induce South Korea to
restore elements, if not all, of the Sunshine Policy and
economic transfers to the North.185 While it is impossible to determine conclusively which of these analyses of the DPRK’s motives is correct, and what is the
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primary driver of North Korea’s actions, the conclusions that can be drawn from these assessments are
extremely disturbing. North Korea has continued not
just to develop nuclear weapons, but also to conduct a
highly risk acceptant policy. This risk acceptant policy
is not merely illustrated in the three provocations of
2010 but in its transfer of missiles and proliferation capabilities abroad. Such policies also include the sale of
nuclear reactors to Syria and missiles to proliferators.
Indeed, by 2007 North Korea had established itself as,
“the Third World’s greatest supplier of missiles, missile components and related technologies.”186 U.S. diplomats also believe that North Korea furnished Iran
with 19 missiles based on a Russian design for submarine based missiles called R-27 that North Korea calls
BM-25 missiles. These nuclear capable missiles enable
Iran to reach European capitals including Moscow.187
But they also allow the DPRK to attack much further
into Asia or the Pacific than has hitherto been believed.
North Korea’s risk-acceptant behavior appears
to be premised on the belief that not only will Russia and China ultimately restrain the United States
from imposing truly serious punishments (be they
sanctions or worse) upon North Korea, but that the
United States will be unable or unwilling to use its full
power to strike back at North Korea for these risky
moves. Neither will Russia or China be able to exercise any decisive restraining leverage upon North Korea. Therefore, North Korea can behave provocatively
at what it believes to be a minimum or at least manageable risk. While this behavior has allowed North
Korea to get nuclear weapons without paying what it
considers to be an unbearable price, it also exposes its
supposed “backers” to the consequences of these great
risks taken in disregard of their interests and without
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their knowledge or acceptance of the risks for them in
that behavior.188 Yet until now, Russian and Chinese
behavior has allowed North Korea to keep on behaving in this provocative manner. As a result, North Korea has repeatedly been able to outmaneuver the other
five members of the process to the point where U.S.
officials have publicly charged that China’s refusal
to exercise a decisive restraining pressure upon the
DPRK, in fact, means that China has become North
Korea’s enabler, a charge that rankles China deeply.189
China may have retracted its position somewhat in
trying to induce a return to some agreeable forum for
negotiations. But it is quite unlikely that in the present
configuration, North Korea will renounce its nuclear
weapons. Its demands that the United States cease its
“hostile policy” essentially amount to an abandonment of South Korea, not denuclearization.190
Yet, as of now nothing seems likely to alter Pyongyang’s calculation of the costs it incurs by acting this
way, including the most recent crises. Indeed, at least
some Russian experts believe that it is impossible to
scare North Korea with sanctions.191 In that case, what
then can the other parties do to it, especially if Beijing
stands behind it as seems to be the case now? Furthermore, in conjunction with the likelihood that further
incidents along the lines of the Cheonan incident might
be in the offing, this kind of behavior could easily ignite the conflagration that Moscow, if not other capitals, most fear.
Under the circumstances, the fact that the military
appears to be the strongest faction in North Korean
politics, and one that must be appeased by provocative international behavior to cement the succession,
or even, as some analysts suggest, that it may to some
degree be acting on its own, raises many great threats
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to regional security.192 If aggressive and defiant international behavior is the price of legitimacy at home,
we can expect many more crises, especially as North
Korea has long acted on the belief that the only way
to get Washington’s or Seoul’s attention is to create a
major crisis, and it may well believe it can take risks
with impunity. But under present conditions, the domestic politics of the United States and South Korea
(as well as probably Japan) preclude any generosity
on their part to North Korea or quick return to the sixparty talks absent guarantees of denuclearization and
an end to provocations, which are no less impossible
for North Korea to give due to its domestic politics. Indeed, so far the United States, Japan, and South Korea
have, not unexpectedly, been unwilling to return to
the talks without apologies for Cheonan or guarantees
of denuclearization.193
Consequently, the intersection of the main players’
domestic politics and regional threat perceptions work
together to frustrate anything but a deepening cycle
of provocations and resistance. Equally plausible is
the fact that North Korean leaders may think they can
take greater risks than are warranted and miscalculate
the outcome. A similar danger may occur in the United States and South Korean governments if their domestic politics make it impossible for them to ignore
further North Korean provocations. In either case, it is
pretty clear that in fact nobody can truly control North
Korea’s behavior or is willing to. Russia certainly has
no leverage on it, and China’s attitude has been less
than helpful from Washington’s point of view.194
Likewise, there is no reason to believe that this
risk-acceptant and provocative behavior will stop
even if new sanctions are imposed. First of all, North
Korea needs the revenues it gains from proliferation,
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which are vital to its economic survival. Second, as
many analysts have argued, China remains unwilling
to bring to bear its full weight to truly implement the
existing UN imposed sanctions. So, new sanctions cannot achieve much in any case.195 More sanctions, even
if they are passed by the UN, only make it harder to
return to the Six-Party process, and not only because
we cannot really count on their full implementation.
Since North Korea demands an end to sanctions that
ban its arms trade as a precondition of returning to
the talks, any new sanctions probably only strengthen its resolve not to rejoin the process. Meanwhile,
North Korea clearly intends to continue these missile
sales despite UN resolutions and other international
mechanisms to block them, such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative. If such blatant risk taking continues unabated, there are real chances that Pyongyang
could miscalculate its adversaries’ response and end
up with a much greater crisis than it had bargained
for.
Beyond this assessment, Michael O’Hanlon has
identified a series of other dangers that could easily grow out of the current situation on the Korean
peninsula. These are the dangers of proliferation
either to terrorists or other states. In the case of collapse, control over nuclear materials could easily deteriorate, enabling possessors of those materials to
sell them abroad to the highest bidder. On the other
hand, should North Korea keep on going as a nuclear
power, its capabilities could either weaken deterrence
among the members of the U.S. Asian alliance system,
or even start a war entailing missile strikes on South
Korea, Japan, or even possibly the United States. Lastly, a nuclear North Korea could engender a “nuclear
domino effect,” leading Japan, South Korea, and pos-
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sibly other states to contemplate going, or to actually
go, nuclear.196
The primary causes for the present situation reside first in the fundamental incompatibility of the
DPRK and U.S. positions; second, in some of the inherent problems of the Six-Party mechanism; third,
in the evolving disparities in the positions of the participants; and fourth in the greatly transformed Asian
strategic environment since 2003 when the talks began. While North Korea now says it is prepared to
return to the talks, it also states that it will not give
up its nuclear weapons under any conditions. Indeed,
it has been saying this since 2009, if not earlier.197 It is
likely that this remains the case, suggesting that the
U.S. demand for an irrevocable prior commitment to
complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament
(CVID) of its nuclear weapons (the old Bush policy)
is a nonstarter and thus an exercise in futility. Indeed,
analysts like the Russian Korea expert, Georgy Toloraya, have openly argued that if the talks are about
denuclearization first and other issues subsequently,
then they will be futile, as North Korea will simply
refuse to play a serious part.198
According to Toloraya:
The usefulness of the Six Party Talks seems to North
Koreans to have been exhausted. Further down the
road they would have to discuss—and probably be
pressed for concessions on something really tangible,
such as their reprocessed fissile materials and actual
nuclear weapons. That, most likely, formed no part of
their calculations, at least at the early stage of searching for a strategic compromise with the West. Understandably, North Koreans became frustrated, as their
tangible gains from the multiparty process were marginal. They did not come much closer to getting sub-
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stantial security guarantees, and even the largely symbolic (and easily reversible) “delisting” of the DPRK
as a terrorist state caused much controversy in the
US and elsewhere, and led to demands for new concessions from it in return. North Koreans saw that as
a breach of trust. Modest economic assistance was
indeed promised when the accord was sealed, but
only Russia carried out its obligations (200 thousand
tons of heavy oil), while other countries either totally
abstained (Japan) or dragged their feet. The DPRK
felt that its concessions were not fully recognized and
valued. “Hawks” in Pyongyang might also have suspected that concessions were perceived in the West
as a sign of weakness and testimony to their pressing
need to normalize relations. No one was impressed,
at least to the extent that North Koreans had probably
expected, with the actual opening of its nuclear program and even the disabling of some objects, though
such things were unimaginable just a few years ago.199

Thus Pyongyang has announced that its agenda
for resuming negotiations focuses on the following
clear set of goals;
•	Recognition of its status as a de facto nuclear
weapon state or, failing that, preventing efforts
to disarm its nuclear weapons,
•	Convincing Washington and others that they
have no choice but to normalize relations with
North Korea as a nuclear state,
•	Maximizing all the material benefits to be
gained through negotiations while conceding
nothing on its nuclear program,
•	Convincing the international community and
UNSC to lift existing sanctions and impose no
new ones,
•	Shifting discussion of the Six-Party Talks from
denuclearization to a “peace regime” based on
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ending or attenuating the U.S. alliances with
Japan and South Korea.200
Consequently, its conditions for rejoining the process are completely antithetical to the U.S. position
that demands an advance commitment, much like
the Bush administration did to complete, verifiable,
and irreversible nuclear disarmament and has shown
no interest in a preceding peace settlement. Pyongyang’s demands and defiant assertion that it will not
denuclearize therefore run straight into Washington’s
counter demand that it will not recognize the DPRK as
a nuclear weapons state, and that it must reenter the
negotiations without any preconditions and denuclearize to avoid further sanctions. Indeed, even China
agrees that a peace treaty to the Korean War cannot be
signed until the North denuclearizes.201 Thus at best,
an impasse appears to be the foreseeable future of the
Six-Party process, even if it somehow resumed soon.
This impasse alone could suffice to torpedo any
early resumption of the Six-Party process. But in the
context of the added crises of November 2010, the domestic constraints on key actors in the wake of U.S.
elections, the collapse of the Sunshine Policy, North
Korea’s succession, and the recent attacks and provocations against the South, it is difficult to see the point
of resuming them, let alone how this resumption
might come about. Yet under the circumstances the
stagnation of the Six-Party process could quite conceivably lead to renewed crises, especially as North
Korea thinks it has to provoke ever-new crises to get
its views heard. Indeed, the Six-Party process has
functioned until now largely as a mechanism for crisis management. But clearly the process is not working or managing crises and could break down. This is
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not altogether surprising inasmuch as the process has
contained within it the seeds of such an outcome from
its inception.
A second cause for the failure of the talks lies in
the inherent practical and theoretical difficulties in arranging any truly coherent multilateral consensus, let
alone a unity of views and actions on an issue touching on all six participants’ vital national interests.202
Inasmuch as all efforts to make progress on or even
resolve the North Korean issues take place within an
environment of multiple triangular and bilateral relationships among the participants, the problems of
mutual coordination are inherently very difficult.203
Beyond these considerations, the record of multilateral security institutions in Asia is not particularly
encouraging. Michael Wesley points out that multilateral Asian security institutions have done poorly
in adapting their original function to changing power
realities, notably rising powers’ demands, and in any
case the Six-Party process has yet to become an accepted multilateral security organization rather than
a crisis management or a somewhat ad hoc organization.204 Indeed, the abundant evidence of the competitive approaches of the six parties to regional security
in Northeast Asia, particularly in the now dynamic
evolution of this region with a rising China, a seemingly declining America, and a threatening North Korea, underscores the difficulty in using the Six-Party
process to find a multilateral harmony over the issues
on its agenda.205
Third, now there is an added problem of emerging
different conceptions of what the Six-Party process is
supposed to achieve. China, for example, is retreating
from the idea that the talks should aim to denuclearize North Korea and serve rather as a means to reduce
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tensions. When Kim Jong-Il visited China in August
2010, the Chinese press and Kim Jong-Il both stressed
that the purpose of the talks was to reduce or even
prevent tensions on the peninsula, not arrange for denuclearization or a peace treaty for the Korean War.206
If this concept of the talks is allowed to gain credence,
North Korea will become a nuclear state de facto and
possibly de jure but will remain an outlaw state in
many real ways and thus an obstacle rather than a contributor to regional security because the United States,
ROK, and Japan will not currently accept North Korea
as a nuclear state. Nor will they accept upending the
Six-Party Talks to serve an agenda that only benefits
Beijing and Pyongyang at their expense.
Even if Russia and China are correct to argue that
denuclearization can only come about as a result of a
long-term process of confidence-building and mutual
security guarantees, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo
were in no mood to hear this argument even before
November 2010 and the events of that month. Since
then, North Korean generated crises and the U.S.
elections virtually preclude any movement to meet
Beijing and Moscow, let alone Pyongyang, halfway.
Japan has publicly stated its belief that this is not an
auspicious time to reconvene the talks, and South Korea and Washington agree with this. South Korea is
demanding an apology for the recent shelling of Yeonpyeong, and the United States still insists on a prior
commitment to denuclearization as a precondition for
resuming the Six-Party Talks.207
Since the end of 2010, this apparent breakdown of
the process due to all these reasons has fostered the
growing intransigence of the major parties. Thus there
is good reason for mounting concern. This intransigence strongly suggests that, absent a major change
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in one of the key participants’ policies, no change is
in sight even though continuation of this impasse
promises no relief of the current crisis for any of the
six parties. Without major changes, the next crisis is
liable to be much more dangerous, as South Korea has
now publicly announced that it will retaliate in force
against new attacks.208 And, as noted above, the advent of the uranium enrichment plant opens up the
possibility for North Korea to begin building many
more nuclear bombs.209 In addition, North Korea now
talks of the situation as being on the brink of war,
and South Korea has pledged retaliation for any future Northern provocations.210 More recently, it was
reported that South Korea might gain support from
the United States to lengthen the reach of its missiles
and is exploring options for returning U.S. TNW to
South Korea. While this was denied, there are political
figures in the ROK who now openly advocate returning those missiles that were removed with the end of
the Cold War in 1991.211
THREATS TO RUSSIA
The threats from further impasse or deterioration
of the Korean situation to Russia are numerous and
underappreciated in the West. For example, since the
Cheonan incident in 2010, the United States has sought
more options with which to punish North Korea, even
if it does not seek war against it. That incident also
has led South Korea to consult even more closely with
both the United States and Japan on a coordinated
response, thereby marginalizing Russia and isolating
China.212 Beyond that, the fallout from this incident
forced Russia to enter into very intense and close consultations with China even though it has no real influence over the other actors.213 But because both China
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and Russia share the view that the greater danger is
instability on the Korean peninsula, China failed to act
this time against North Korea; it and Russia have been
in some measure isolated, while the United States
and its allies have grown closer and more demanding. They are still in no hurry to resume the Six-Party
process without prior North Korean concessions.214
Not only does this isolate China and Russia, it also
deprives Russia of its minimal means of influencing
regional events and preserves the regional bipolarity
in Northeast Asia that could more easily lead to a conflict against its interests. Asian observers even believe
that China’s failure to act contributed to Washington’s
decision to move naval vessels closer to China.215 We
could therefore see more provocative behavior from
North Korea and a hardening of U.S. positions that
would merely intensify the existing polarization between Washington and Pyongyang, as well as that between Washington and Beijing, and increase mistrust,
suspicion, etc.
The current situation also offers other dangers to
Russia, e.g., marginalization. Clearly, nobody has considered it seriously as a partner in the diplomacy revolving around this crisis. South Korea and the United States approached China and Japan to coordinate
regional and allied responses, isolating Russia even
though China failed to act. Consequently, Russia unilaterally stepped into the breach, conducting its own
investigation of the incident and desperately scrambling to save the Six-Party process or figure out some
other process through which it can play a role commensurate with its ambitions. The Russian investigation challenged South Korea’s view, saying the ship
sank due to an explosion caused by its own navigational errors, but this investigation was not released,
lest Russia’s position be further eroded.216
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Whatever problems these trends cause for the
other five powers, arguably this impasse most injures
Russia as a participant in the larger Korean peace
process. Since this process not only aims to deal with
the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation, but also to chart a
path toward an overall peace for Korea and to create new multilateral frameworks for Northeast Asia,
the longer this impasse lasts, the more Russia suffers.
This is not just because Russia is the chairman of the
working group on a new multilateral security system
for Northeast Asia, although that is serious enough.
The current impasse threatens Russian interests in
many ways. First, Russia confronts an explosive situation and potential crisis of immense magnitude on its
doorstep where it has little or no influence over many
of the main actors, not least Pyongyang. This crisis,
which it can do little to manage or control, has enormous potential consequences for Russia. A recent article in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ journal, Inter
national Affairs, stated (incidentally quoting a Chinese
analyst, Zhou Feng):
Indeed, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which
is in close proximity to our Far Eastern borders, is
explosive and fraught with the most unpredictable
consequences. Peace is very fragile here. No one can
guarantee that it will not collapse as a result of a clash
between the two Koreas with the involvement of other
countries in the conflict and the use of weapons of
mass destruction. “The aggravation of the North Korean nuclear issue is one of the long standing problems
leading to new ones. This issue cannot be expected to
be settled easily because difficulties have emerged in
relations among large East Asian states. The settlement process can subsequently lead to a redistribution
of roles of large states on the Asian political field—that
is a new regional security problem.217
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That restructuring of the Asian political order could
easily ensue at Russia’s expense, given its visibly relative weakness there, and it could ensue by means over
which Russia has little or no influence, even if they are
not violent means. While Moscow has long since said
that it does not fear the unification of the two Koreas
and might actually welcome that outcome, it could
only do so if it happened through a peaceful process,
not war.218
This potential restructuring of the Asian state
system also has profound implications for RFE that
Moscow already sees as a major security problem due
to its relative poverty, isolation from European Russia, and vulnerability to a host of foreign influences,
particularly a Chinese economic takeover.219 Failure to
move forward on the Korean issues, if it leads to war
or the stagnation of regional economic development,
threatens Russia’s domestic development program for
the RFE. As Gleb Ivashentsov, Moscow’s Ambassador
to Seoul has said:
In no other region are internal and external interests
of Russia so interconnected as in Northeast Asia. For
the future of Russia as a great power to a great extent
depends on the economic, technological, and social
uplift of Siberia and the Russian Far East. To achieve
that aim we need the absence of external threats. By
Russia’s view such guarantees could be best provided
by promoting positive relations with her neighbors.220

Therefore Russia desperately wants to prevent a
war breaking out over Korea either by U.S. and ROK
attacks upon the North, or if the North was to attack
South Korea or Japan. Moscow’s reaction to the Cheon
an incident, its professed skepticism as to whether
North Korea actually sank the ship, insistence on
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conducting its own investigation, readiness to cooperate with China to avert escalation of the crisis by all
means, and insistence on returning to the table all indicate its anxiety lest this crisis engender a breakdown
of the negotiation process or actual conflict.221
That conflict could quickly escalate even to the nuclear level and only end with a hostile power (either
the United States or China) occupying North Korea
and its border with Russia. It is not certain that Russia
could stay out of such a war, and the consequences
for it would, under almost every imaginable circumstance, be very severe. No outcome here is acceptable
to Russia, but its means of preventing these possible
outcomes are decidedly limited. At the same time,
conflict in the Korean peninsula also undermines any
hope of developing the RFE with foreign assistance,
since Russia cannot do so alone. Absent such development all talk of Russia as a great Asian power remains
just that, talk.
Beyond preventing a war Russia has several other
objectives regarding Korea that are now at risk due
to the current impasse. Primarily, it seeks to obtain
lasting acknowledgement of its status as a great Asian
power that can participate in and is necessary for establishing a regional Asian-Pacific security system. Indeed, it publicly regards its participation in these talks
as a touchstone of the international recognition and
acknowledgment of that status. Therefore, it takes its
standing in the Six-Party process very seriously. Russia’s exclusion from the efforts in the 1990s to deal with
North Korea’s nuclearization were widely resented
and taken as a sign of its marginality in Asia, much
to Russia’s anger. Prominent U.S. Asia expert Lowell
Dittmer actually referred to the Russia of this time as
a diplomatic nonentity.222 Not surprisingly, foreign, if
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not domestic, observers also seriously questioned the
notion that Russia was a great power or entitled to
claim such a status that every Russian politician believes to be Russia’s birthright.223
Moreover, continuing impasse prevents Russia
from recovering any true economic influence as a
large-scale energy provider to both Koreas and essentially cedes the field to China, if not other players, as
states who might gain economic influence over North
Korea. Moscow intends to use its ability to supply
both Koreas with energy both to ensure its place in the
settlement, and unite them with Russia in an enduring economic-political association. Once the Six-Party
agreement of February 2007 took shape, ITAR-TASS
reported comments by a foreign policy expert that
Russia could create the conditions needed to implement “a series of major multilateral projects with the
participation of both North Korea and Russia,” including oil and gas transit, electricity transfers, and
the so-called TKR-TSR project connecting a TransKorean railway with Russia’s Trans-Siberian railway,
the centerpiece of Russian transport policy for Asia.224
Significantly, this source saw these projects as benefiting not just Moscow and Pyongyang, but also Seoul.225
Both the ROK and Russia also eagerly wish to construct a Russian gas pipeline through both Koreas,
complete with a petrochemical industrial park and a
LNG plant. That should begin in 2010, be completed
in 2015, and ship 7.5 million tons of gas (measured in
LNG) annually for 30 years, 20 percent of the ROK’s
annual import of natural gas.226 The cost of this socalled natural gas pipeline (PNG) project is enormous.
If it succeeds, this will be a super-size economic cooperation project worth over $100 US Billion, covering
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the purchasing price of natural gas (US $90 Billion),
construction costs for the petrochemical industrial
park (US$ 9 Billion), and construction costs for the
PNG through North Korea. (US$3 Billion) This project
will represent a typical energy development project
promoted by the Lee-Myung Bak government.227

The opportunity to provide North Korea, and
through it South Korea, with reliable sources of energy is essential if Russia is to be a meaningful presence
in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia’s regional
security order. Indeed, energy supplies might be the
only way Russia can play a major role in any Korean
peace process. Even that might not be enough as we
have seen how little Russia actually contributes to the
Six-Party Talks. In 2007-08, there was even speculation that Russia is wearying of the Six-Party Talks due
both to North Korea’s obstreperous behavior but also
because the bilateral talks between the United States
and North Korea had sidelined it and Japan, relegating them to a lower status in the talks.228 In the RussoJapanese foreign ministers talks in December 2009,
Foreign Minister Lavrov dismissed such talk, paradoxically and unintentionally suggesting Russia’s
fears of any bilateral U.S.–DPRK deal.229 Naturally,
Russian analysts are at pains to refute such arguments,
constantly invoking Russia’s importance to the talks,
its constructive plans for a settlement, etc.230 Nevertheless despite its rancor at these characterizations, the
fact remains that Russia is far from being a major factor at these talks whereas the United States and China
are the players whose role is decisive to their outcome.
Consequently, the collapse of the Six-Party process
is a major loss for Russia because it delays and minimizes Russia’s chances to count for something serious
in the Korean security equation and puts its overall
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Asian policy at considerable risk. Not surprisingly,
it has consistently counseled moderation towards
North Korea, been very cautious about sanctions even
though President Medvedev considers North Korea
a greater threat than Iran, and has steadfastly argued
for resuming the Six-Party Talks despite North Korea’s provocative nuclear and missile tests. Moscow
has steadily argued against military action, hinted
that sanctions might be lifted if the DPRK rejoined the
talks, suggested that the IAEA become involved with
this issue, and proclaimed its willingness to provide
economic assistance.231 But it is Washington and Beijing, not Moscow, that will decide the issue of the talks
for Pyongyang, signifying Russia’s limited power to
influence events here.
The breakdown of those talks also nullifies the
discussions that Moscow sponsored about creating a
multilateral security mechanism for Northeast Asia as
part of the 2007 agreements, a long-standing point in
Soviet and Russian foreign policy.232 As Georgy Toloraya writes:
Russia sees a multiparty diplomatic process as essential for attaining the aforementioned objectives.
The eventual creation of a regional (or sub-regional)
system of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia
would benefit Russia, as it would enable it to have a
greater say in the area and create more opportunities
to promote its own interests, including economic ones.
Russia aspires to become a “Eurasian bridge” which
would speed up the development of its Far Eastern regions and facilitate its deeper integration in the Asian
economic space, and its development as an “Asian
energy-power.”233
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Absent such a mechanism, Moscow finds it harder
to play a role in Northeast Asia as an independent
competitive actor. Nonetheless, Moscow keeps devising formulas for regional conflict resolution because
it now publicly admits to anxiety about the future
security equation. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei
Borodavkin, Moscow’s representative to the Six-Party
Talks, announced that Russia’s discussions with the
other five parties led it to formulate a draft on “Guiding
Principles for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia.”
Borodavkin admitted that existing conflicts in Korea
and Afghanistan worsened in 2009. Consequently,
“We proceed from the assumption that one of the
most important prerequisites and components of the
denuclearization process is the formation of regional
common security institutions which would be based
on the principle of equal security to all parties.”234
Such calls underscore Moscow’s less than equal status here that makes the success of such plans unlikely.
But Borodavkin further underscored Russia’s genuine
alarm about Korea by stating that the aggravation of
Asian conflicts, together with the global economic
crisis have created a situation where, “Under current
circumstances, peace, and security in the region is a
priority task because we believe that neither nuclear
deterrence nor military deterrence may ensure security in this sub-region and in the entire world.”235 That
is, further North Korean provocations might push one
or another actor over the edge, and Russia cannot do
anything to stop it. Indeed, Moscow even deployed its
new S-400 SAM to the RFE from fears that North Korea might launch more missiles that either go awry or
worse, provoke a major conflict in Northeast Asia.236
For Borodavkin, this danger means Russia must participate more actively in the region, and its activity has
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become more substantive, focused on economic integration.237
Thus even though Moscow has indicated its willingness as part of the reset policy to cooperate with
Washington on curbing proliferation, it has a very
different posture and outlook regarding the two most
outstanding proliferation issues currently on the international agenda. If the reset policy is not to be undone due to the confluence of regional security and
proliferation issues that challenge both sides’ ability
to find common ground, something more is needed.
Or to put it bluntly, the U.S. policy of “strategic patience” in regard to North Korea, which boils down to
making no moves until Pyongyang concedes to Washington’s agenda, must be amended, if not reversed.
In Iran’s case, too, something must be done because
Iran, despite foreign pressures, and the U.S. effort at
engaging it, shows no sign of slowing down or renouncing its quest for nuclear weapons. In the Iranian
case, while some have argued that the United States
should accept deterrence of a nuclear Iran our allies,
particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia, cannot and will
not accept that strategy. For them, a nuclear Iran is
an existential threat of the highest order and an intelligent approach will realize that Iran cannot therefore
(especially given the current turmoil in the Middle
East) be allowed to gain usable nuclear weapons under any circumstances.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A sound U.S. policy approach that considers the
regional dimensions of the reset policy, as well as the
limited utility to date of Russian cooperation on proliferation issues, should understand that more of the
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same, especially in Korea, is an abdication of responsibility, not an answer to the problems confronting any
U.S. administration’s efforts to advance the national
interest. In plain English, the U.S. 20-year obsession
with proliferation has led to a virtually complete strategic and policy failure. Far from reducing it, we are,
in fact, managing proliferation. India and Pakistan
have gone nuclear, other nuclear powers are modernizing their arsenals, nothing has stopped Iran, the
war in Iraq to terminate its alleged proliferation was
a disaster, and North Korea has nuclear weapons and
is testing nuclear weapons of ever greater range and
capability. As one recent account observes:
Despite many rhetorical compliments, the Six-Party
Talks have revealed their limit as a framework to
resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. North Korea quadrupled nuclear capabilities during the talks,
conducted two nuclear tests, built up uranium enrichment capabilities and secretly provided Syria with an
upgraded version of the 5MWEe reactor at Yongbyon.
Compared to the mid-1990s, the amount of plutonium
the DPRK possesses has increased form 7-12.5kg to
28.5-49 kg at the end of 2007. The possible number of
nuclear warheads has also increased from 1-5 to 5-20
or so depending on various criteria and technologies.
This is the end result of the Six-Party Talks.238

It also appears that in both Iran and North Korea’s
cases, they can still count on Moscow and Beijing to
mitigate any sanctions policy and obstruct the outcome of any diplomatic pressure on them to yield nuclear weapons as part of a political process. Furthermore, in the wake of current trends in the Middle East,
it appears that the U.S. position and perception of its
reliability are eroding. In the Far East, if we look at the
Russian position in a perspective that includes the sit77

uation on the Korean peninsula, mounting concern is
also warranted. Though Russia has been a vital player
in Asia since the 1858 treaty of Aigun with China if
not earlier, Russian and foreign observers acknowledge that in East Asia, it confronts marginalization as
a significant, not to mention great, power. Confirming
this bleak assessment and expanding it is the shocking
(at least it should be shocking to Moscow and other
observers) fact cited by a U.S. Army colonel who leads
officers on tours of Asian think tanks that Chinese,
Japanese, South Korean, and Mongolian think tanks
unanimously told his group in 2010 that Russia would
soon play no role in East Asian security.239 While Russia has essentially had to mortgage the development
of the RFE to China because of its own systemic failures, at the same time there is ample evidence that its
military increasingly vocally and publicly perceives a
mounting Chinese military threat in addition to the
potential of China’s economy to subordinate Russia
to its ambitions. In short, in the larger Asian arena of
which the Korean question is a major, but not exclusive, part, Russia confronts the genuine prospect and
threat of its marginalization as an independent sovereign, great power actor. That is a nightmare scenario
for Russia, yet it appears incapable of doing what is
needed to reverse that trend.240
The United States will not benefit from that outcome, but China will. Indeed, this trend completes the
strategic reversal in Asia that has negated the fundamental strategic principles of U.S. policy there going
back to the Open Door Notes of 1898. We no longer
have a Russo-Japanese contest of hegemony in Asia in
rivalry to the United States, with the prize being domination of China. China’s rise transforms the regional,
if not global, equation and forces new approaches to
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regional security issues upon us. Moreover, Russia’s
failure to develop on its own or to escape the condition its leaders now perceive of being isolated from
everyone in Asia only redounds to China’s benefit and
jeopardizes the overall balance or equilibrium in East
Asia.241
Historically it was the United States, not China,
that defined the parameters of Russian power in Asia.
In that context, the satellization of Russia is a blow to
a strategy that has lasted since 1898 when John Hay
formulated the Open Door policy. Allowing China to
usurp that role and downgrade Russia as a factor in
Asia signifies our strategic fecklessness. Washington
assumed its role beginning in 1898 with the proclamation of the Open Door policy. In 1905 Theodore Roosevelt mediated the Portsmouth Treaty that ended the
Russo-Japanese war. The Washington Conference of
1921 redefined the new post-World War I status quo
in East Asia and strove to limit the reach of Soviet
and Japanese revisionism in China.242 Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) in 1933 was clearly a measure to balance Japan, which had broken that balance, by raising
the specter of amity with the Soviet Union, and was
understood as such by the USSR, which was gravely
threatened by Japanese imperialism.243 Likewise, Soviet participation in the Pacific War in 1945 was only
possible through massive U.S. logistical assistance
to Moscow that enabled it to move its forces from
Central Europe to the RFE and then into Manchuria,
Mongolia, and Korea. Similarly, it was U.S. forces that
stopped the North Korean and Chinese offensives in
the Korean War, and then subsequently engineered
the conversion of China into an American partner and
the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1978 that stopped aggressive Soviet policies in East Asia.
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Thus Washington upheld first a regional and then
simultaneously a global balance until the 1990s, when
it began to forget its history. Geopolitically, the strategy rested on upholding Chinese independence against
all imperialisms (the open door) keeping Japan and
Russia separated and hostile, and preventing or at
least containing any Sino-Russian alliance or domination of either one by the other. Hence, our continuing support for Japan’s position regarding the Kurile
Islands.244 Accordingly, some of our leading experts
have warned that the greatest possible threat facing
Washington could be a Sino-Russian alliance. Therefore, signs of such an alliance must be disquieting as
this collusion could also betoken the first tangible and
successful example of regional balancing against U.S.
preponderance.245 Indeed, adding to our disarray is the
fact that we have completely neglected Russia as a potential partner in Asia, even as the reset policy openly
stated the need for such partnerships in Europe, the
Middle East, and Central Asia. Meanwhile, Russia returned the favor by refusing to discuss its Asian policy
and threats to its security with the West.246
Given the now visible strategic linkage between
the reset policy, Asia’s strategic transformation, and
the urgency of North Korean proliferation, we have
the means and motive to revive our well-conceived
strategic tradition since China is intent on defending
North Korea and blocking the United States there,
and the U.S. military strategy now accepts Russia as
a potential partner in East Asia.247 Moreover, the Russian press, and therefore the Russian government,
have noticed that acceptance too.248 But to implement
this strategy, we, our allies, and Russia must take coordinated and reciprocal steps. A strategy based on
Chinese weakness is inconceivable. The clear and
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present danger is not a Russian-Chinese alliance, but
rather a Chinese-dominated partnership with Russia
and North Korea as junior partners that menace an increasingly apprehensive Japan and South Korea. This
generates the need for prior agreement on the basis of
intense consultations with Japan and South Korea on
vital issues facing them. First, the United States must
formulate an initiative towards Russia that helps bring
it over to the U.S. side in the Six-Party Talks on Korea.
This entails the much greater U.S. engagement with
Pyongyang that the DPRK wants. While conservatives
and Republicans will oppose this, their policy of isolating North Korea has failed principally because the
DPRK can count on Sino-Russian policy to reduce any
cost to Pyongyang or its provocative behavior. Ultimately, there is no way out of this issue except by a negotiated settlement or war as we cannot simply count
on North Korea yielding to pressure or collapsing. In
any case, China blocks and mitigates any successful
employment of pressure upon the DPRK, and Russia
supports it for now.
Here we must remember that this process is not
merely about North Korean disarmament. Rather it is
about creating a new, legitimate, and enduring, peaceful order in Northeast Asia in which all the parties can
participate securely. Even if we believe or know for
sure that North Korea will collapse, we must treat
it as if it is a durable and ultimately legitimate state
capable of making and implementing commitments
made to other players. The notion that we do not negotiate with “evil,” while popular, contradicts any
notion of sound diplomacy aimed at preventing war,
possibly the greatest evil in world politics. Moreover,
the earlier widespread belief that North Korea’s collapse is only a matter of time has not been borne out.
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Despite withering crises, the regime has survived and
is currently undergoing a succession transition. While
its leadership transition may be a major source of its
provocative behavior, it is also clear that no external
source has much influence over it, thus North Korea
has gained a certain measure of stability. Moreover,
its possession of nuclear weapons increases its interlocutors’ interest in its stability, not its disintegration.
Likewise, the idea that China will exercise pressure on
our behalf on North Korea is another unsound idea
that has failed to materialize. Therefore, Washington
should seek to reshape the East Asian order that would
duly emerge there to its advantage and not Beijing’s.
Absent a coherent or viable allied approach, North
Korea will end up as China’s economic protectorate as
will Russia’s Asian provinces, thus undermining any
hopes for stability in Northeast Asia for a long time.
This logic reinforces our prior point that we cannot
count on a North Korean collapse and must seriously
engage it.
Meanwhile, Russia benefits greatly by having an
American option with which to counter China and
while it would not be an ally or even a full partner
with us, that offer could appreciably distance it from
its lockstep identification with China’s Korea policy.
For example, a U.S. guarantee that it and/or its allies
will underwrite the cost of providing North Korea
with Russian energy as part of any subsequent accord
would certainly play very well in Moscow. Such an
initiative might also make North Korea sit up and take
notice that 3+3 bipolarity in the talks had changed to
4+2 against it, where China does not relish being left
alone with North Korea. Moreover, only direct engagement with North Korea allows the United States
to shape the future of the two Korean states in positive
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ways without leaving the field to a Russo-Chinese alliance dominated by Beijing, with Pyongyang as another Chinese satellite. That approach would play well in
South Korean politics and also grant Seoul a greater
say in what happens to or in North Korea than would
otherwise be the case. Meanwhile, Russia could then
add its leverage to a U.S. plan to engage North Korea directly within the Six-Party framework, as China
and others have recommended. Then it might be possible to resume negotiations with North Korea under
conditions acceptable to the other parties and with
the promise of an expanded direct U.S. engagement
that is essential to any lasting peace process. This
program might also make the Six-Party process a real
rather than fictitious vehicle for actually restructuring
Northeast Asian security.
The second prong of this strategy relates to RussoJapanese relations that are now at an impasse. Moscow
apparently thinks it can bully Japan into accepting
the postwar settlement of the Northern Territories or
Kurile Islands and simultaneously induce large-scale
Japanese investment in Russia, even as it insults Japanese sensitivities and refuses to reform its economy
to attract more investment. Thus, Moscow plays to its
domestic galleries, sends cabinet ministers to the Kurile Islands, and is even launching a development plan
and military buildup there.249 Meanwhile Japanese
experts doubt that Russian energy fields there can be
developed on sufficiently large a scale to fulfill Moscow’s expectations of huge East Asian markets for its
energy (which Japan does not now need even after its
earthquake and collapse of the Fukushima reactor).250
Japan’s domestic politics also inhibit its government
from relaxing its claim to all four of the Kurile Islands
and certainly U.S. support for this position adds to
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its inflexibility.251 But, in fact, Japan clearly has no viable answer to Russia’s chauvinistic policy other than
to impede investment in Russia.252 Though Japanese
businesses would like to invest in Russia if they could
guarantee profitability, they will not do so until Russia changes its policies nor will the government encourage them until the territorial issues are settled.253
Here, too, there must be a U.S. initiative. We would
probably be doing Japan a service if we persuade it to
accept Putin’s resurrection of Khrushchev’s 1956 offer
of two of the four Kurile islands as the best it will get
for now because the dangers posed by a nuclear North
Korea and a rising China that defends it outweigh the
benefits of domestic posturing for otherwise unattainable territories.254 Nonetheless, it is the only proposal
that has any chance of succeeding of normalizing Russo-Japanese relations. It, too, would give Russia a Japanese option for investing in the RFE and completing
a pipeline to the Pacific coast that would free it from
excessive, even unilateral dependency on China’s energy market. Meanwhile, this would reduce Japanese
and U.S. fears of a Sino-Russian alliance. On the diplomatic front, these initiatives, especially if they are
coordinated with our allies, would reduce China’s
unilateral ability to rearrange East Asia’s balance of
power to its benefit and help bring about a solution
to two current long-lasting problems, the urgent one
of finding a way to reduce the North Korean nuclear
threat, while bringing North Korea into some sort of
durable, legitimate regional order and second, the
abnormal relationship between Russia and Japan. Absent such initiatives, Russia will almost certainly incline toward China. Indeed, there are those who claim
that Russia has agreed with China’s position on the
disputed Diaoutyi Islands with Japan in order to gain
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Chinese support for its position on the Kurile Islands,
thus essentially forming a diplomatic anti-Japanese alliance.255 This kind of bloc is precisely the threat that
we have worked to prevent since 1949, and it should
not be allowed to form because too many observers
here are too complacent about Sino-Russian relations
to notice their trend lines.
The key benefits to Russia of these moves would
not just be that it no longer need rely exclusively on
China as its gateway into Asian diplomacy or that it
must face a potential Chinese military threat alone.
Such initiatives would unlock possibilities as well for
Russia to undertake successfully what is the essential
precondition for its success in Asia, reinvestment, with
large-scale foreign help in Siberia and the RFE. But
for these U.S. and allied initiatives to succeed, Russia
cannot just be a passive recipient that pockets these
reforms and happily exploits them. It, too, must act to
attract these initiatives and give Washington, Tokyo,
and Seoul lasting reasons for believing that they will
succeed. Russia must allay the heavy burden of past
suspicions arousing out of its policies. To make itself
worthy of partnership and to survive as a great Asian
power, Russia must change its policies to keep pace
with the huge changes occurring there. Obviously, the
success of these initiatives is predicated upon Russia
altering its present diplomatic stance over time in response to those foreign invitations. But the changes
that Russia must make to gain from these offers, survive, and even flourish as an independent Asian power go deeper than that.
The changes that must occur relate to the opening up of the RFE, if not Russia, as a whole to foreign
investment. The sums required to develop the RFE’s
blighted infrastructure and its resource base are astro-
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nomical and will not be forthcoming unless and until
Russia can guarantee, as China has done since 1978,
the security and profitability of foreign investment
without being expropriated by local or central governing elites’ capricious whims, either local or central.
Essentially, this means no more Khodorkovsky cases
and no more Magnitsky affairs, to cite only two of the
most outstanding examples of governmental raiding
of businesses in Russia. Only if Russia changes its laws
and policies to ensure that property owners’ rights’
will be legally defended and subjected to exclusively
legal processes during disputes can it attract the investments it needs to develop Russia as a whole, and
the RFE in particular. We should not shy away from
indicating our awareness that these changes entail
profound and hopefully lasting changes in Russian
politics and economics. But they are the only changes
that can allow Moscow to realize its twin desires to rebuild the RFE and play a meaningful independent role
in East Asia. A Russia capable of such a role would
add to, rather than detract from, the regional balance
there.
A Russian failure to make these moves, which
we must admit is quite likely, essentially means renouncing those foreign policy objectives and the RFE
becoming by default a Chinese economic colony. Indeed, as Russian leaders know and say, development
is the precondition for any successful policy in Asia.256
If Russia fails to become “a worthy economic partner”
for Asia and the Pacific Rim, Deputy Prime Minister
and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin warned that,
“China and the Southeast Asian countries will steamroll Siberia and the Far East.”257 China would then
also steamroll Russia in Central Asia. Similarly, Putin
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warned local audiences in 2000 that if Russia failed
to reform, then they would end up speaking Chinese,
Japanese, and Korean.258 Russian leaders clearly know
what will happen if China is the only significant investor in the RFE.
A U.S. initiative treating Russia as a serious East
Asian partner, engaging in a real dialogue on security threats there, and a strong public expression of
U.S. willingness to invest in the RFE in return for real
guarantees of that investment, and to encourage concurrent Japanese and South Korean investment there
could well elicit a favorable Russian response. But
this means a fundamental change in Russian policy
whose scope and far-reaching implications cannot
and should not be underestimated. Therefore, it is
quite possible that the Russian government will fail,
as it has since 1970, to seize the opportunity in East
Asia. The Russo-Chinese partnership has been largely
an anti-American and anti-liberal affair since its inception.259 It continues because it reinforces the nature
of Russia’s economic and political system that has led
it to the brink of marginalization in Asia but which
rewards its leaders handsomely. The reform of that
system and of the accompanying mentalities and even
pathological economic and political behaviors that accompany it are not only in the U.S. and its allies’ interests. Above all, they are in the interests of Russia’s
people. Insofar as Asia is concerned, they are in the
interest of the Russian state because otherwise only
China will be interested in the RFE. Should that situation come to pass, China, but not Russia will benefit
from that outcome.
These initiatives should be followed up at the relevant levels of the U.S. Army. For example, U.S. Forces
Korea (USFK) and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) need

87

to continue and, if necessary, intensify their review of
all possible contingencies that could occur on the Korean peninsula and do so through games, conferences,
exercises, etc. both alone and with Japan and the ROK.
These actions could include both civilian experts and
military leaders and forces where appropriate. Beyond
that and in view of the Pentagon’s statement that it
sees Russia as a partner in the Asia-Pacific region, it
is worth considering inviting Russian civilian experts
and military officials and commanders to participate
where feasible in these exercises and actions.260
The United States should launch these initiatives
because it needs help in Asia to balance a rising and
increasingly aggressive China. While anti-liberalism
may benefit Russia’s leaders who stand to be further
enriched from sell-offs of Russian material and political resources to China and the accompanying bribes, it
neither benefits their successors, the Russian state, or
its people. Washington should make the offer out of a
deep consideration of its evolving national interest in
East Asia. But should it launch these initiatives to no
avail due to Russia’s refusal to accept them, it will still
be able, with its allies, to cope with strategic trends
in East Asia. However, if Russia should fail to rise to
the opportunity that now might be offered to it, Russia’s interests will not be at stake. Rather, its survival
as a great independent Asian power will be at risk for
that issue is now on the table. Even if Moscow does
not fully realize this fact, we should realize it and extend these offers to Russia for that is the most we can
do. But in Asia, as elsewhere, Russia’s future is in its
hands.
On the other hand, in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, there is no sign that Russia, let alone China
will support further diplomatic efforts directed against
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Iran. In earlier works, this author has argued strongly
on behalf of an engagement strategy directed towards
Iran and North Korea.261 But Iran has contemptuously rejected that engagement when it was offered.
This left the effort to enlist Russian and Chinese support against Iran. But that policy line has apparently
reached the limit of its usefulness and with it any real
hope for a diplomatic or purely political resolution of
the problem. As Iran moves forward despite the obstacles the United States, Europe, and Israel, have put
before it narrows further any hope for a nonmilitary
answer to the problem. Covert action and sabotage
might succeed, but again they may also fail to arrest
or reverse Iran’s determined program for nuclear
weapons and the generation of an insurgency across
the Middle East; that is, in fact, the current situation.
While the regional trends within the Northeast
Asian environment require continuing resort to creative political means backed up by strong deterrent
capabilities and allied unity, the conditions presently
obtaining in the Gulf and Middle East increasingly
suggest that such measures will only have limited success at best. It is by no means inconceivable that we
could approach a situation where direct application
of force to cripple, if not destroy, Iran’s nuclear program, either launched by the United States or by Israel
(who, as we said, cannot accept in any way a nuclear
Iran bent on its destruction) becomes the only possible solution to the threat of Iranian nuclearization.
But for that to be avoided, we need to induce or obtain
a change in Moscow’s, if not Beijing’s, perception of
the stakes and, more of the same, to judge from recent
Russian actions and statements, is not the answer to
that problem.
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Therefore we need a stronger awareness of how regional dynamics affect not only Russian policy, but the
overall reset policy as a whole. Only on that basis can
it succeed in realizing its progenitors’ hopes. These examples from both sides’ domestic, foreign, and defense
policies, but with emphasis here on Russian perspectives, underscore the fragility of efforts like the reset
policy and the all-encompassing need on all sides for
sober statecraft removed from the mythologies and realities of the Cold War or from the new mythologies of
the Post-Cold War period. Putin might complain that
episodes like Libya have become stable or recurring
events in U.S. national security policy, but Russia, too,
is a country that has been at war since 1994 and with
few, if any positive, results as the tension with Georgia and the endless and failing war against insurgency
in the North Caucasus show us.262 Those conflicts, too,
have lasting consequences beyond Russia’s borders.
Both states’ progress towards international security
requires more than blaming others. Instead, it requires
a deeper understanding of just how interrelated the
effects of crisis, policy, and war are in today’s world
and a more sober appreciation of the risks that even
local crises, be they expected or not, can provide to the
wider global environment.
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